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We investigate the effect of board (audit committee) gender diversity on audit fees in the 
French context. We also examine whether the relationship between the proportion of female 
directors (audit committee members) and audit fees is moderated by the enactment of gender 
quota law in 2011. We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of 
French firms listed in the SBF 120 stock market index between the years 2002 and 2017. Our 
results confirm the fact that female independent directors and female audit committee members 
improve board monitoring effectiveness, resulting in lower audit fees paid to incumbent 
auditors. Our findings also document that, while breaking the glass ceiling, the effectiveness of 
the gender quota law lies not in increasing the proportion of female insider directors, but in 
boosting the appointment of women as independent directors and as audit committee members. 
Using the difference-in-difference approach, our results reveal that female independent 
directors and female audit committee members are more willing to assert their monitoring skills 
after the quota law, leading to lower audit fees. Additionally, we show that, after the quota law, 
the negative impact on the non-audit fees is strengthened only for female independent board 
(audit committee) directors. Moving beyond tokenism, our results provide evidence on the 
importance of independence for female board (audit committee) members to assert their 
monitoring skills and to achieve better audit outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The core objective of statutory audit is to protect the rights of shareholders by detecting 
incidents of expropriation by insiders (Newman, Patterson, & Smith, 2005). More specifically, 
external auditors verify that all stakeholders are treated equally and that financial records 
comply with statutory requirements. In the external audit process, auditors view the board of 
directors as their client, because the board reviews the scope of the audit and the proposed audit 
fee (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). The board is responsible for making sure that “appropriate 
information and reporting systems” are in place for providing timely and accurate information 
to ensure corporate compliance and performance. Directors can avoid liability claims by being 
duly diligent and by making sure that standards are met. The board of directors generally does 
this by purchasing high quality audits in order to protect its reputation capital, to avoid legal 
liability, and to promote shareholders’ interests (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002). 
Boards of directors exercise their monitoring function through independent directors and audit 
committees (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Klein, 2002). In response to corporate failures such as 
Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat, there has been increased interest in the role played by the 
board of directors (audit committees) in providing efficient monitoring. Existing studies 
investigate how board characteristics such as CEO duality, board independence, ownership 
structure, gender diversity, and constitution of the audit committee affect financial reporting 
quality (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002; Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2006; DeFond & Francis, 
2005; Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, & Chtioui, 2018; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015; Ittonen, 
Miettinen, & Vähämaa, 2010; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2017; Mitra, Hossain, & Deis, 2007). 
In the literature, there is no consensus regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance effectiveness and audit fees. However, two perspectives are frequently discussed, 
and lead to somewhat differing results (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004; Hay, 
Knechel, & Wong, 2006; Knechel & Willekens, 2006; Zaman, hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). Audit 
fees may be affected by both the demand for audit services by client firm and the supply of 
audit services by an external auditor (Carcello et al., 2002; Harjoto et al., 2015; Ittonen et al., 
2010; Lai et al., 2017). From the demand-side perspective, boards (audit committees) that are 
more effective are likely to demand higher audit effort resulting in higher audit fees. 
Conversely, firms with good governance practices may be less in need of assurance provided 
by external auditors, thus lowering audit fees. The supply-side argument suggests that a more 
effective board (audit committee) ensures the quality of firms’ internal audit and internal control 
systems. In doing so, more effective board (audit committee) may reduce the assessed level of 
control risk and thereby reduce the need for assurance required from the external auditor, thus 
reducing audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). Although these two perspectives do not necessarily lead 
to the same conclusions, the demand side and supply-side arguments are not mutually exclusive 
(Ittonen et al., 2010). Barroso, Ben Ali, and Lesage (2018) highlight the audit setting puzzle 
and document that the demand side and the supply side of audit services are markedly affected 
by the level of agency conflicts between management and shareholders, and the degree of 
shareholder protection. Studying, in the French context, the effectiveness of the board (audit 
committee) gender diversity through the assessment of the demand and supply of external audit 
services might add a new piece to the puzzle. 
In this study, we explore the relationship between board (audit committee) gender diversity 
and audit fees. Specifically, we examine the relationship between female directors (audit 
committee members) and audit fees by emphasizing the importance of female positions on the 
board. Existing studies suggest that women behave differently than men when appointed to the 
same positions (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bennouri, Chtioui, Nagati, & Nekhili, 2018; Harjoto 
et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2017). Along similar lines, empirical studies provide strong grounds for 
believing that female directors (audit committee members) substantially affect the fees paid to 
incumbent auditors (Harjoto et al., 2015; Huang, Huang, & Lee, 2014; Ittonen et al., 2010; Lai 
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et al., 2017). Four reasons can be put forward as to why our research is important. First, a main 
current of the corporate governance literature suggests that female directors have different 
monitoring behavior than male directors, exhibit higher levels of independence, and are more 
likely to be concerned about shareholder interests (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bennouri et al., 
2018; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Gull et al., 2018; Gyapong, Monem, & Hu, 2016; Lai et al., 
2017). Second, there is a consensus among scholars that female directors tend to be more risk 
averse and more concerned about ethical issues than men when making organizational decisions 
(Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Schubert, 2006). In particular, female independent directors 
and female audit committee members help strengthen internal controls and are likely to reduce 
the levels of inherent and control risk (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Olcina-Sempere, 2016). 
Third, there has been a substantial upsurge in regulatory and academic interest in the role of 
board (audit committee) gender diversity in strengthening corporate governance, particularly 
after the enactment of gender quotas for corporate boards. Despite the recent increase in the 
number of female directors on corporate boards following gender quota legislation, there is a 
paucity of studies exploring the link between board gender diversity and audit fees. 
There are few studies that empirically examine the relationship between board (audit 
committee) gender diversity and audit fees. Lai et al. (2017) conducted a study in a U.S. context 
to examine the impact of board gender diversity on audit quality, measured by audit fees and 
auditor choice. Their findings indicate that boards with female directors pay more for audit 
services and tend to appoint industry specialist auditors as opposed to boards composed solely 
of male directors. Another study, by Hay et al. (2006), conducted a meta-analysis of the last 25 
years’ audit research and revealed that the majority of studies have been conducted using 
Anglo-Saxon data. They also note inconsistencies, anomalies, and gaps in the existing literature 
and suggest studying the effects of different forms of ownership and of local institutional factors 
on audit fees. Our study adds to the existing literature in various ways. We examine the French 
context, where there is a different ownership pattern and a different legal and institutional 
environment from the United States and other Anglo-Saxon economies. The main features of 
French companies are the concentration of ownership and the separation of ownership and 
control (Bennouri, Nekhili, & Touron, 2015; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998), whereas in the U.S. ownership is dispersed. With regard to external 
auditing, two unique features of French companies are joint auditing (Audousset-Coulier, 2015; 
Bennouri et al., 2015) and the appointment of statutory auditors by the board of directors rather 
than by the audit committee, in accordance with Article L. 225-228 of the French Commercial 
Code. Our study thus augments the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between board gender diversity and audit fees in a French context. 
Following the wave of worldwide promotion of gender equality, France has implemented 
in January 2011 mandatory quotas to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. As a result, 
French firms were required to appoint at least 40% women to their board of directors by the 
end of 2016. Whereas firms would face serious consequences for not complying, this reform 
does not provide any guidelines as to the roles that should be assigned to female directors. 
Nevertheless, the independence of the board (e.g., Klein 2002; Carcello et al. 2006) as well as 
the promotion (and the characteristics) of audit committees (e.g., Turley & Zaman, 2004; 
Ittonen et al., 2010; Compernolle, 2018) are premised to strengthen the corporate governance 
effectiveness. Consistently, both independent directorships and board committee membership 
are regarded as senior board positions. Since, these roles require the performance of specific 
tasks and duties for which the individuals concerned must have relevant expertise and skills 
(Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013). Senior board positions such as independent directorships and audit 
committee membership are of central importance from the standpoint of auditing, because of 
the monitoring function of the board of directors. In light of the tokenism theory of Kanter 
(1977), we also investigate whether gender quota legislation affects board decision-making 
process since female directors may not be able to assert their legitimacy due to their minority 
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status before the implementation of the quota law (e.g., Erkut, Kramer, & Konrad, 2008). 
Consistently, we investigate whether the implementation of gender quota legislation impacts 
the relationship between board (audit committee) gender-diversity and audit fees and to which 
extent female directors may assert differently their monitoring skills in mandatory and in 
voluntary setting. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists in support of the 
moderating role of gender quota legislation in the relationship between board (audit committee) 
gender diversity and audit fees. 
Using a sample of the largest French firms listed in the SBF 120 stock market index from 
2002 to 2017, we find that board (audit committee) gender diversity has a substantial impact on 
audit fees. In contrast to the study by Lai et al (2017) in the U.S. context, our findings reveal 
that board gender diversity is negatively correlated with the demand for audit effort, as 
measured by audit fees. This preliminary finding provides evidence on the differences in 
governance and the legal structure between the U.S and other countries. Importantly, in looking 
at female positions on boards of directors, we find that female independent board directors and 
female audit committee members, but not female insider directors, have a negative effect on 
audit fees. These results support the argument that the proportion of female independent 
directors (audit committee members) enhances the monitoring ability of the board (audit 
committee), resulting in the reduction of audit risk as well as the need for assurance provided 
by external auditors in terms of audit effort. Our study takes into account the French gender 
quota law enacted in January 2011, thus allowing us to examine the implications of both 
voluntary and mandatory board gender-diversity. Using a difference-in-difference approach, 
we find that the effectiveness of the gender quota law, in terms of lowering audit fees, is due to 
the increase in the proportion of female directors overall, but rather to the appointment of 
women as independent directors and as audit committee members. These results support the 
decision by French companies, since the coming into force of the gender quota law in 2012, to 
promote the proportion of female independent directors and female audit committee members 
at the expense of the proportion of female insider directors, suggesting the preference of French 
firms to more active monitoring role of female directors in a mandatory context. In a 
supplementary analysis, we mainly show that the level of non-audit fees is affected negatively 
by board (audit committee) gender diversity. The negative effect is, however, strengthened after 
the implementation of the gender quota law only for female independent board (audit 
committee) directors. Going beyond tokenism, our results provide evidence on the importance 
of the role assigned to female board (audit committee) members to achieve better audit 
outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the main 
features of the French setting. Section 3 presents the well-known reforms related to board 
gender diversity around the world. Section 4 concisely reviews the literature related to board 
and audit committee gender diversity with regard to audit fees paid to incumbent auditors. We 
then discuss our data, methodology, and variables in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyze the 
data and discuss our results. In the concluding section, we look at possibilities for future 
research. 
 
2. FRENCH INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The French setting is relevant to our research question because investor protection is a serious 
concern in France given the country’s civil law based legal system (La Porta et al., 1998). Gull 
et al. (2018) and Nekhili and Cherif (2011) argue that the absence of effective procedures for 
protecting minority shareholders provides opportunities for managers to expropriate outsiders’ 
assets, either by manipulating earnings or by using self-dealing transactions. This situation may 
give rise to concerns as to the veracity of financial reports (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 
2004). Furthermore, the concentration of ownership in the hands of families and the separation 
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of ownership and control are distinctive features of the French market (Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
Barroso et al. (2018) argue that ownership structure affects differently both the demand side 
and the supply side of audit services depending on level of agency conflicts between 
shareholders and management or between controlling and minority shareholders. In countries 
with higher ownership concentration and weaker investor protection, such as France, the main 
concern is to protect minority shareholders from being abused through earnings management 
or self-dealing transactions. It is essential to detect and punish expropriations by insiders (i.e., 
managers and controlling shareholders) in order to protect outside investors (Newman et al., 
2005). An extensive external audit may be a good way of detecting expropriations, as well as 
promoting the interest of minority shareholders and enhancing the quality of financial reporting 
(Carcello et al., 2002).  
The French external audit process differs from that of the United States and other Anglo-
Saxon countries in at least two ways. First, joint auditing is mandatory by law in France 
(Audousset-Coulier, 2015; Bennouri et al., 2015). On 24 July 1966, Article 223-3 of the French 
Companies Act made it mandatory for listed companies and certain other companies to adopt 
joint audits. In joint auditing, two or more independent auditors collectively carry out, sign, and 
issue an audit report. Joint auditing may also have implications for investor protection, audit 
quality, and fees, due to the involvement of two different auditors. In contrast with US and 
similarly to UK, French audit committees do not choose the statutory auditors, but propose the 
names of external auditors for appointment or reappointment to the board of directors in 
accordance with Article 41 of (EU) Regulation No 537/2014 of 16 April 2014 and Article 
L.823-3-1 of the French Commercial Code. The choice of statutory auditors is therefore the 
responsibility of the board of directors rather than the audit committee. In this regard, Article 
L.225-228 of the French Commercial Code states that “the auditors are proposed for 
appointment by the general meeting in a draft resolution from the board of directors or the 
supervisory board. If the company’s shares are admitted to trading in a regulated market, the 
board of directors chooses the auditors that it plans to propose”. The direct involvement of the 
board in the process of appointing the external auditors means that we cannot limit ourselves to 
studying the audit committee when examining the issue of external audit in France. 
Furthermore, the board of directors is perceived as an important mechanism for protecting 
shareholders and for ensuring the quality of financial reporting (Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; 
Carcello et al., 2002). More specifically, board characteristics such as independence, expertise, 
and gender diversity are highly likely to promote minority shareholders’ interests through their 
influence on external audit effort (Carcello et al., 2002; Lai et al., 2017). In support of our 
research question, there is considerable evidence that female directors are stricter monitors of 
management (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gull et al., 2018), while gender diversity is associated 
with audit effort and, de facto, with the fees paid to their incumbent auditors (Harjoto et al., 
2015; Huang et al., 2014; Ittonen et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2017). 
In January 2011, the French Parliament introduced a law establishing quotas for the gender 
balance of company boards. The quota law was enacted in 2011 and firms had until the 
beginning of 2017 to make the necessary changes to their boards (Bennouri et al., 2018). The 
Copé-Zimmermann law states that, five years after its enactment in 2011, female directors must 
comprise at least 40% of board members for the largest listed and non-listed French firms (those 
having at least 500 employees and a turnover of more than EUR 50 million). The law was 
introduced in stages: from 2014, 20% of a firm’s board members were required to be female, 
rising to 40% by the start of 2017. Firms failing to comply with the legislation face sanctions 
such as fines, dissolution or a ban on the payment of directors’ fees. Consistent with the 
tokenism theory of Kanter (1977), the introduction of the French quota legislation in January 
2011 provides opportunity to question whether gender quota regulation helps female directors 
to assert their effective monitoring skills and to what extent the implementation of gender quota 
legislation impacts the relationship between board (audit committee) gender-diversity and audit 
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fees. 
3. INTERNATIONAL BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY REFORMS 
It is a well-documented fact that men are dominant in boardrooms around the globe and women 
are under-represented compared to their proportion in the workforce (Dale-Olsen, Schøne, & 
Verner, 2013; Leszczyńska, 2018; Mateos de Cabo, Terjesen, Escot, & Gimeno, 2019; Piscopo 
& Clark Muntean, 2018; Smith, 2018; Teigen, 2012). The idea of increasing the representation 
of women on corporate boards has gained considerable ground in the last decade. In particular, 
the believe that women are not suitable for placement in key positions has been extensively 
criticized (Nekhili, Chakroun, & Chtioui, 2018). In 2003, women accounted for only 9% of the 
members of boards of directors in the 28 European Union countries. This proportion increased 
to 11% in 2008 and 12% in 2010 (European Commission 2014a,b & 2018). In June 2012, the 
European Commission’s Network to Promote Women in Decision-Making in Politics and the 
Economy highlighted the importance of using women’s talents in politics and the corporate 
world for enhancing competitiveness, dealing with economic crises and shaping a sustainable 
future for Europe. Disappointed by the slow advancement of women in the top tiers, the 
European Commission issued a Directive that urged listed companies to increase the 
representation of women in boardrooms to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020, with the further aim 
of making this proposal a mandatory quota (European Commission, 2012; Leszczyńska, 2018; 
Smith, 2018). 
In view of the sensitivity of the issue and potential discrimination in boardrooms, many 
countries have implemented policy reforms of one kind or another to promote gender diversity 
on boards of directors. These policy reforms may be categorized mainly into two types: 
‘mandatory’ vs. ‘voluntary’ board gender diversity requirements. Mandatory reforms refer to 
gender quota legislation that can also take two forms (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2019; Terjesen, 
Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). The first of these involves ‘hard quotas’, as in Norway and France. 
Hard quotas mean that companies failing to maintain the required number or percentage of 
women on the board of directors will face legal sanctions such as delisting from the stock 
exchange or forced dissolution. The second form is the ‘soft quota’, adopted by Spain and the 
Netherlands. In soft quota regulation, companies failing to reach the required level of board 
gender diversity do not face any legal sanctions and may continue to trade. However, they will 
not be considered for subsidies and government contracts and in the event of non-compliance 
will be given recommendations, warnings and reports. In extreme cases, boards that do not 
fulfill gender diversity appointment criteria and fail to provide satisfactory reasons for non-
compliance are dissolved. Voluntary reforms, on the other hand, refer to non-binding or self-
regulatory diversity requirements. States adhering to voluntary reforms, such as Australia, 
United Kingdom and United States, provide diversity guidelines in their codes of corporate 
governance and require companies either to comply with the recommendations or give their 
reasons for non-compliance. The voluntary approach based on the ‘comply or explain’ strategy 
is providing slow but significant improvements in the level of women board representation 
without introducing any binding requirements for companies (Terjesen et al., 2015). In contrast, 
quotas provide a ‘quick fix’ solution, mainly to the issue of gender balance on corporate boards 
(Smith, 2018). 
Norway was the first state to introduce board gender quota legislation as a way to change 
the long-standing male dominance in the upper echelons of the corporate world. In January 
2006, legislation was approved mandating that there must be at least 40% of each gender on the 
boards of state-owned and public limited companies by January 2008. Thereafter, non-
complying firms would face fines, delisting from the stock exchange, and dissolution. No other 
state has made such a success of ‘hard’ board gender quota legislation as Norway (Dale-Olsen 
et al., 2013; Teigen, 2012; Terjesen et al., 2015). Motivated by the success of Norwegian 
experience, in 2007 Spain became the second country to enact quota legislation requiring public 
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companies to have at least 40% representation of each gender on corporate boards. 
Subsequently, many other countries followed Norway and Spain and introduced similar 
reforms. Iceland approved a law in 2010, with the target of at least 40% women on the boards 
of state-owned companies, public limited companies and private companies with more than 
fifty employees by September 2013. Similar to Spain, the Icelandic legislation does not impose 
any sanctions on non-complying firms, although newly formed companies are required to meet 
the specified level of 40% gender equality (Arnardottir & Sigurjonsson, 2017). In 2011, a 
gender quota law requiring 33% representation of women on corporate boards was approved 
by the Belgian government in order to resolve the issue of gender diversity in the top tiers of 
the business world. Like in Norway and France, the Belgian government imposed sanctions on 
firms that do not comply with the law, in order to ensure the success of the gender quota reforms 
(Levrau, 2017; Terjesen et al., 2015). Following the trend, Italy also introduced on 28 June 
2011 reforms for balancing the gender representation on corporate boards, which came into 
force on 12 August 2011. This law requires public listed companies to have a minimum 
representation of each gender on their board of directors. If the company still fails to comply, 
the elected board will be declared null (Ferrari, Ferraro, Profeta, & Pronzato, 2018; Maida & 
Weber, 2019). In 2013, the Netherlands implemented a gender quota law requiring large public 
and limited liability companies to appoint a minimum of 30% women to their boards (Kruisinga 
& Senden, 2017). This was a temporary ‘soft’ quota law applicable only for a period of three 
years, with no penalties for non-compliance, and it automatically expired on 1 January 2016. 
However, the reform was notably unsuccessful, since the average proportion of women on the 
boards of the companies concerned was only 9.6% in 2014 and 10.2% in 2016 (Kruisinga & 
Senden, 2017). As with the boards of Dutch companies, men also outnumbered women in 
German companies. The proportion of women on the management and supervisory boards of 
large German companies in 2015 was approximately 6% and 20%, respectively (Holst & 
Kirsch, 2016). The German government introduced a quota law in 2014 requiring state-owned 
companies to have 30% and 50% of women on their board of directors by 2016 and 2018, 
respectively (Piscopo & Clark Muntean, 2018). Two years later, in 2017, Portugal introduced 
gender quota legislation for listed companies, with which non-compliance may result in fines. 
The Portuguese gender quota law requires listed companies to have at least 33.3% women on 
their board of directors. In the same year, Austria also implemented a gender quota law for the 
supervisory boards of listed firms and those having a workforce of more than a thousand. The 
Austrian quota law requires the supervisory boards of the firms concerned to have at least 30% 
women on their boards. In the event of non-compliance with the quota law, board appointments 
by the Austrian firms concerned will be considered illegitimate (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2019). 
Some other countries require public companies to have at least one woman on their board 
of directors. Israel was the first state to mandate public companies in 1999 to appoint at least 
one woman to their board of directors. Ten years later, in 2008, Finland introduced similar 
reforms for public limited companies. Then in 2012 and 2013, the requirement to have at least 
one woman on corporate boards of public companies was adopted by UAE and India, 
respectively. The most recent example of this kind of board gender quota reform is Pakistan. In 
May 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) required listed 
companies to have at least one woman director on their board within three years. Appendix 1 
provides a summary of mandatory board gender diversity reforms adopted by different 
countries. 
[Please insert Appendix 1 here] 
An alternative method used by some countries to improve the representation of women on 
corporate boards is ‘voluntary’ reforms. Australia became the first country to adopt voluntary 
reforms in 2010 by adding a number of diversity policies in the national code of corporate 
governance for listed firms. This code requires listed companies to prepare and disclose their 
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diversity policy as well as gender diversity objectives and progress towards achieving the set 
objectives. Companies are also required to disclose their board’s hiring processes, the 
proportion of women in executive and board positions, and the proportion female employees in 
the company. In 2010, the proportion of women on boards of Australian companies was around 
8%, which increased to 15.7% in the three years up to May 2013. The figure further increased 
to 31.5% in large Australian companies by December 2018, as mentioned in the MSCI’s recent 
progress report on board gender diversity, almost double the proportion in 2013. These figures 
show the success of board gender diversity reforms adopted by Australia. The most impressive 
thing is that representation of women on boards has increased without using any binding or 
quota legislation. Instead, the reform was solely based on ‘comply or explain’ principles, 
meaning that companies either comply or give an explanation in the event of non-compliance.1 
Along similar lines, the board gender diversity policy reforms in the United Kingdom are 
based on non-mandatory recommendations, a self-regulatory approach and suggested targets. 
Women accounted for 12.5% of the board of directors of FTSE 100 companies in 2010 as 
compared to 9.4% in 2004.2 Furthermore, 21% of FTSE 100 companies had no women on their 
board of directors, only 2% of FTSE 100 companies had a woman as the board chair, and the 
proportion of women among newly appointed directors was only just over than 13%. 
Considering the slower rate of growth, Lord Davies proposed a voluntary and self-regulatory 
approach rather than gender quotas based on mandatory reforms. The Davies report made ten 
recommendations in 2011, the most notable of which was that FTSE 100 boards should increase 
the proportion of women to 25% by 2015 and attempt to fill 33.33% of all new board 
appointments with women. Two years later, in 2013, the Cranfield School of Management 
investigated the effect of the recommendations made by the Davies report. The Cranfield review 
showed that no significant progress towards the target set by the Davies report had yet been 
made. In particular, the review revealed that the proportion of female directors had increased to 
17% and that 6% of FTSE 100 firms still have all-male boards. A 2012 review also showed that 
only 38 FTSE 100 firms set targets for the level of board gender diversity they aimed to achieve 
by 2015. In addition, around 40 companies refused to set any targets and many firms declined 
to disclose their gender diversity policy or statistics relevant to the number of women at any 
level of the company (Choudhury, 2014). The findings of later reviews reveal that the United 
Kingdom’s experience of voluntary board gender diversity reforms was not as successful as 
Australia’s. A summary of countries that implemented voluntary board gender diversity 
reforms through suggestions or recommendations in corporate governance codes is given in 
Appendix 2. 
[Please insert Appendix 2 here] 
There are arguments for and against mandatory and voluntary board gender diversity 
reforms. First, mandatory reforms increase the number of female directors in a shorter period 
of time (e.g., Norway and France) compared to voluntary reforms (UK and Australia). Second, 
mandatory reforms improve the monitoring ability of boards because women tend to monitor 
managers more strictly than men. Third, mandatory gender diversity reforms may enhance the 
board’s decision-making, through the opinions of diverse board members being taken into 
account. On the other hand, diversity can also cause communication problems within diverse 
boards of directors. Fourth, mandatory reforms may exacerbate the issue of token female 
directors, because quota laws force organizations to hire women to the board of directors simply 
by virtue of their gender, and consequently they may be less well qualified (Choudhury, 2015; 
Smith, 2018). Fifth, mandatory reforms may promote the practice of multiple directorships for 
existing women directors due to the lack of availability of qualified women. This particular 
 
1 For more details see Choudhury (2015).  
2 https://www.womenonboards.net 
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argument is supported by the findings of Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) that Norwegian 
mandatory board diversity reforms has increased neither the percentage of female directors nor 
the number of female board chairs. Although the number of women holding multiple 
directorships has increased significantly – Norway’s so-called ‘golden skirts’ – a few women 
have become more prominent and powerful as a result of the quota law. Conversely, Dale-Olsen 
et al. (2013) reported that the Norwegian reform was successful from purely a representational 
perspective. Finally, it is implausible to suppose that the desired level of board gender diversity 
can be achieved without implementing mandatory reforms, such as those introduced by Norway 
(Choudhury, 2015). 
Our paper adds substantially to the discussion on the arguments for and against mandatory 
and voluntary board gender requirement by investigating whether quota provides a simple 
solution to the issue of gender balance on corporate boards or, by breaking the glass ceiling, 
helps female board (audit committee) members to assert their monitoring skills, reducing the 
need of assurance provided by external auditors and lowering audit fees. 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.1. Board Gender Diversity and Audit Fees 
Recently, the debate among scholars in corporate finance and accounting has focused on 
the impact of gender diversity on board proceedings. These studies highlight that gender 
differences among directors and managers can be explained by differences in their 
communication skills, decision-making style, level of overconfidence, risk tolerance, diligence, 
and monitoring intensity (Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bennouri 
et al., 2018; Gul et al., 2011; Gull et al., 2018; Gyapong et al., 2016; Harjoto et al., 2015; Huang 
& Kisgen, 2013; Huang et al., 2014; Ittonen et al., 2010; Schubert, 2006). The ability to 
communicate effectively is an important skill for performing well in key managerial positions. 
There is substantial evidence that women have better communication skills and outperform men 
in jobs that require communication with various people (Schubert, 2006). Moreover, female 
directors are likely to reduce information asymmetry by collecting voluntary information from 
managers and sharing it with the board (Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009). Another school of thought 
holds that women, in comparison to men, take ethical considerations more into account when 
making decisions (Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1998; Gyapong et al., 
2016). Consequently, female board members may prompt a greater demand for audit (Lai et al, 
2017), especially in situations characterized by ethical dilemmas, in order to protect personal 
and organizational reputations and to avoid potential law suits (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 
1990). Together, these arguments suggest that women are likely to strengthen the monitoring 
function of the board. 
A large body of literature confirms that women are more conservative and risk-averse than 
men (Byrnes et al., 1999; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Powell & Ansic, 1997). According to 
Schubert (2006) and Watson and McNaughton (2007), women prefer to guard against losses by 
not taking extreme risks. Additionally, as highlighted by Fondas and Sassalos (2000), women 
have higher expectations regarding their responsibilities as directors, which may lead them to 
perform well. Second, female directors tend to be better prepared for board meetings than their 
male colleagues (Huse & Solberg, 2006). Gender diversity is therefore likely to improve board 
behavior and efficiency. Another argument in support of gender diversity might be that, due to 
the glass ceiling effect, women need to exhibit a higher level of competence than men in order 
to reach key managerial and board positions (Eagly & Carli, 2003). Consequently, female 
representation may increase the proficiency of corporate boards because female directors are 
highly diligent and competent. 
With regard to the external audit process, because of women’s greater accounting 
conservatism and more risk-averse behavior compared to men, auditors may perceive firms 
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with gender diverse boards as being less likely to make financial misstatements. Auditors may 
therefore be prepared to limit the scope of their audit, leading to a lower audit fee. This argument 
is corroborated by the study by Ittonen et al. (2010), who report that gender-diverse audit 
committees tend to pay less for audit services. It may thus be argued that gender diversity 
enriches the monitoring and oversight function of the board. The conservatism and risk-
aversion of female board members may also have consequences for the credibility of the 
financial reporting process. According to the findings of a recent study by García-Sánchez, 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Meca (2017), the presence of women on the board of directors is 
instrumental in promoting accounting conservatism and producing higher quality earnings 
reports. Female directors are known for their favorable impact on the quality of financial 
reporting (Abbott et al., 2012; Barua, Davidson, Rama, & Thiruvadi, 2010; Srinidhi, Gul, & 
Tsui, 2011), which may reduce the need for assurance provided by external auditors. 
With regard to quota reforms, some critics of mandatory board gender diversity argue that 
quotas may promote the practice of tokenism by appointing unqualified women to the board of 
directors just because of gender (Choudhury, 2015; Smith, 2018) that may deteriorate the 
quality of monitoring by the board. These scholars suspect that firms may misuse mandatory 
board gender diversity reforms by appointing token female directors. Support to this argument 
is provided by Bolshaw (2011), who report that several wives of leading politicians and 
controlling shareholders were appointed to the boards of largest French firms after enactment 
of board gender quotas. Such appointments are classic cases of token female directors and are 
likely to affect adversely the monitoring function of the board. In line with this conjecture, we 
argue that gender-diverse boards may not demand higher audit effort from external auditors due 
to the less monitoring tendency of token female directors. Conversely, it may be the case that 
external auditors expand the scope of audit task by realizing the fact that gender-diverse boards 
are less likely to monitor management strictly due to the presence of token female directors 
especially after implementation of board gender quotas in France.  
The above arguments imply that there may be either a positive or a negative relationship 
between the proportion of female directors and audit fees. Therefore, we propose the following 
alternative hypothesis. 
H1a: Board gender diversity is positively associated with audit fees. 
H1b: Board gender diversity is negatively associated with audit fees. 
4.2. Appointment of Women as Independent Directors and Audit Fees 
Accounting studies examining the effect of board structure demonstrate that board 
independence is associated with greater disclosure, lower earnings management, and lower 
audit risks (Bedard & Johnstone 2004; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Gul & Leung 2004). 
Boards with more independent directors monitor managers intensely, thereby improving the 
financial reporting quality of their firms (Klein 2002; Carcello et al. 2006). The demand for 
higher audit effort from external auditors is another mechanism adopted by independent 
directors for ensuring the quality of financial information, (Carcello et al., 2002; Lai et al., 
2017).  
Prior research documents that women tend to exhibit a higher level of independence than 
their male counterparts. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that women do not 
belong to the “old boys’ club,” and are therefore expected to challenge the opinions of their 
colleagues, encourage discussion of sensitive issues, and provide concrete evidence to defend 
their arguments. They are very much expected to exhibit activism and an independent approach 
in board proceedings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In addition to monitoring skills, female 
directors have higher ethical standards, are more risk averse, exhibit less opportunistic behavior, 
want to avoid the risk of litigation, and are highly concerned about personal and organizational 
reputation (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Srinidhi et al., 2011). Support 
for this conjecture is offered by Lai et al. (2017), who report that gender-diverse boards appoint 
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industry-specialist auditors and demand higher audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees. Their 
doing so might be due to women’s greater concern for high quality audit information, risk 
oversight, and control mechanisms (Aldamen, Hollindale, & Ziegelmayer, 2018). In line with 
these studies, female independent directors may demand higher audit effort to ensure the quality 
of financial information and to protect their personal and organizational reputation. 
Another conjecture is that the presence of women on boards is associated with superior 
quality financial information. Support for this suggestion is provided by Abbott et al. (2012), 
who find that boards with at least one woman are less likely to revise their financial statements. 
Consistently, Arun, Almahrog, and Aribi (2015) argue that managers are less likely to 
“massage” earnings in the presence of female independent directors. Likewise, the presence of 
female independent directors on audit committees is positively associated with the transparency 
of financial information (Pucheta-Martinez et al., 2016). Bearing in mind the effective 
monitoring skills and favorable impact of female independent directors on the quality of 
financial information (Abbott et al., 2012; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Barua et al., 2010), an 
alternative explanation might be that the appointment of women as independent directors 
reduces the level of audit risk and the need for assurance provided by external auditors. This 
would result in less need for substantive external control, thus lowering audit fees.  
Consequently, we posit the following alternative hypothesis:  
H2a: The proportion of female independent directors is positively associated with audit fees. 
H2b: The proportion of female independent directors is negatively associated with audit fees. 
4.3. Gender-Diverse Audit Committees and Audit Fees 
As a part of corporate governance system, audit committees play a key role in ensuring the 
quality of financial information. Various studies have shown that audit committee 
characteristics may affect audit committee effectiveness. The relation between audit committee 
characteristics and audit fees has been investigated by several scholars (Abbott, Parker, Peters, 
& Raghunandan, 2003; Carcello et al., 2002; Harjoto et al., 2015; Ittonen et al., 2010; Lai et al., 
2017). These studies show that audit committee characteristics such as size, independence, 
expertise, meeting activity and gender diversity are important determinants of audit fees.  
Audit committees serve as an interface between external auditors and the management of 
the client firm (Compernolle, 2018; Klein, 2002; Turley & Zaman, 2004). Similarly, an audit 
committee can increase the independence level of external auditors by providing them support 
in the event of any conflict with the management (Compernolle, 2018; Ittonen et al., 2010; 
Turley & Zaman, 2004). In this regard, gender-diverse audit committees can facilitate the 
exchange of information among external auditors and internal management as a result of their 
superior communication skills. Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that women are more likely 
than their male counterparts to serve on audit committees because of their better monitoring 
skills. Audit committees are also responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, 
including internal audit and control systems and the external audit function. Audit committee 
members suffer costs to their reputation when they fail to discharge monitoring duties 
effectively. Directors with a reputation for being effective (ineffective) monitors are rewarded 
(punished) with increases (decreases) in the number of directorships held (Gilson, 1990). 
Furthermore, audit committee members are liable to experience increased turnover when their 
companies issue accounting restatements (Srinivasan, 2005). 
Consistently with this suggestion, we argue that gender-diverse audit committees will 
display a greater tendency to be risk averse due to the reluctance of women to take risks. Thus 
female audit committee members will prefer to have greater assurance in order to protect their 
reputation as monitoring experts. Assurance can be obtained in two alternative ways. First, 
gender-diverse audit committees may demand higher audit effort from external auditors (e.g., 
longer hours and/or a greater proportion of experienced auditors assigned to the audit), leading 
to higher audit fees. This view is consistent with the demand-side argument. Support for this 
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argument is provided by Lai et al. (2017), who find that gender-diverse audit committees are 
likely to demand greater audit effort from external auditors. Following a similar line of research, 
Aldamen et al. (2018) confirm a positive relation between the presence of women on audit 
committees and the demand for greater audit effort. Therefore, the presence of women on an 
audit committee is likely to be associated with higher audit fees. 
Gender-diverse audit committees can achieve greater assurance by strict monitoring of 
management in order to ensure the quality of internal control systems and of the financial 
reporting process. In this regard, Srinidhi et al. (2011) suggest that firms with gender-diverse 
audit committees have higher earnings and better reporting, which in turn enhance the 
confidence of external auditors in the firms’ financial statements. Pucheta-Martinez et al. (2016) 
find that the proportion of female directors, female independent directors on audit committees 
and audit committees chaired by women is correlated with the probability of transparency in 
financial reporting, by disclosing audit reports with uncertainties and possible scope limitation. 
A recent study conducted by Gull et al. (2018) in the French context shows that the presence of 
women on audit committees is negatively associated with earnings management. In line with 
the evidence provided by these studies and the supply-side perspective, we argue that the 
presence of women on audit committees may affect auditors’ assessment of the internal control 
system by decreasing control risk, potential audit effort and audit fees. This argument is 
confirmed by the findings of two relevant studies (Harjoto et al., 2015; Ittonen et al., 2010).  
Based on these arguments, we formulate the following alternative hypothesis:  
H3a: The appointment of women to audit committees is positively associated with audit fees. 
H3b: The appointment of women to audit committees is negatively associated with audit fees. 
4.4. The Moderating Role of the Gender Quota Law 
As mentioned earlier, the French gender quota law was enacted on 13 January 2011. As a result, 
the number and the proportion of women on boards are increasing, though not without raising 
questions about the consequences of such developments on the efficiency of the board’s 
decision-making. While empirical results on the relationship between the gender quota for 
female directors and firm performance are mixed (Smith, 2018), there is a consensus that boards 
(audit committees) with more female members are more likely to be tougher monitors of 
company executives. If female directors faced many constraints and often serve as tokenism 
due to their minority status (e.g., Erkut et al., 2008), we should expect that gender quota law 
will give female directors more opportunities to assert their monitoring skills and will positively 
impact the board’s decision-making process. However, it is notable that French gender quota 
legislation does not specify either the role played by female directors on the board nor the 
position that they occupy. To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to support the 
moderating role of the gender quota law in the relationship between board (audit committee) 
gender diversity and audit fees. Subject to the confirmation of H1, H2 and H3, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: If an association exists between board (audit committee) gender diversity and audit efforts, 
the gender quota law will strengthen the extent of that association. 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Data and Sample 
To compose our sample, we initially considered the largest French firms listed in the SBF 120 
index. In this study, we utilize annual data over a period of 16 years from 2002 to 2017. We 
start our sample period from 2002, as audit fee data was not available before the introduction 
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of the French Financial Security Law.3 From this initial population, we eliminated financial, 
real estate, and foreign companies, as well as companies with missing data. After this screening, 
our final sample consists of 97 firms and an unbalanced panel sample totaling 1488 firm-year 
observations. We used Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk)4 to collect accounting and financial 
information. All information on audit fees, non-audit fees, governance structure, ownership 
structure, female directors, and their appointment as independent directors or audit committee 
members was compiled manually from annual reports and registration documents available on 
the French Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) website5 or on the 
websites of individual companies. 
5.2. Model and Variables 
The relationship between female directorship and audit fees may be tainted because of some 
observable or unobservable characteristics that affect both gender diversity and audit fees. We 
therefore consider both female directorships and audit fees as endogenous variables. It might 
be possible that the impact of board gender diversity is due to some firm-specific variables 
affecting both the appointment of female directors and audit fees simultaneously, thereby 
leading to biased results due to a potential endogeneity problem. To address this issue, we first 
control for firm-specific variables that may influence the appointment of female directors and 
audit fees by performing Propensity Score Matching (PSM) between firms with at least one 
female director and the subsample of firms with only male directors. We follow Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and use the two-step system GMM approach to test the dynamic relationship 
between gender-diverse boards and audit fees. The system GMM produces more reliable results 
by controlling for simultaneity and omitted variable biases. Additionally, static audit fee models 
invariably omit an important dynamic dimension of audit pricing behavior (Kacer, Peel, Peel, 
& Wilson, 2018). To address the consistency of the GMM estimator, we use Arellano-Bond 
(1991) auto-correlation tests to detect dynamic specifications of the endogenous and dependent 
variables. According to Roodman (2009), the system GMM model performs better with only 
first-order serially correlated processes. The system GMM approach allows to estimate the 
relationship between female directorship and audit fees in both levels and first differences. The 
level equation presents audit fees as a function of its past values (lagged values), observable 
firm characteristics, and the error term including a fixed effect component. The difference 
equation presents year-to-year differences as instruments in the level equation. Two standards 
specification tests are carried out to strengthen the choice of the system GMM estimation 
methodology. The first is the Sargan test for over-identification. The second is the Hansen test 
of exogeneity of the instruments.  
We then test our research hypotheses using the regression model given in Equation (1). 
Following previous studies (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2014; Ittonen et al., 2010; 
Kacer et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2017; Peel & Makepeace, 2012), we use the natural logarithm of 
audit fees as the dependent variable in order to study the relationship between board gender 
diversity and audit fees. We also consider governance, ownership, and other control variables 
that may influence both gender diversity and audit fees. 
𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐸𝑀_𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐹𝐸 + 𝛼6𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (1) 
 
3 The French Financial Security Law of 2003 made it mandatory for companies to disclose the fees paid to their 
auditors. However, in compliance with the European Commission recommendations of May 2002 many firms had 
already started publishing audit fee data on a voluntary basis. 
4 Orbis BvD - Bureau Van Dijk. https://www.bvdinfo.com/ 
5 https://www.amf-france.org/ 
14 
where εit is the error term and the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 stand for firm and year, respectively.   
AUD_FEE is the natural logarithm of audit fees. Lag AUD_FEE is the lagged value of audit 
fees. FEM_BD is the proxy for board gender diversity. First, we follow Al-Shaer and Zaman 
(2016) by examining a range of measures of gender diversity: the proportion of female directors 
(PRFEM_BD), the number of female directors (NBFEM_BD) and two indices of gender 
diversity: the Shannon index (SHAN_BD) and the Blau index (BLAU_BD).6 Following Lai et 
al. (2017), we also consider the position of female directors on the board so as to distinguish 
between female insider directors who are only on the board and those appointed as independent 
and audit committee members.7 This analysis serves to show whether female directors exhibit 
intrinsically different skills according to their position on the board. We then measure the 
proportion of female insider directors in the total number of board directors (PRFEM_INS), the 
proportion of female non-executive independent directors in the total number of board directors 
(PRFEM_IND) and the proportion of female audit committee members on the audit committee 
(PRFEM_ADC). 
CORPORATE_GOV is a vector of the corporate governance variables that we consider in 
this study (BD_SIZE, BD_IND, BD_MEET, ADC_SIZE, ADC_IND, ADC_MEET, DUAL, 
CEO_TEN, FEM_CEO, FAM_OWN, and INST_OWN). In the same way, CONTROL is a 
vector of control variables (BIG, AUD_TEN, NONAUD_FEE, LEV, TOBIN, LOSS, R&D, 
FOR_ASSETS, BETA, CROSS, REC&INV, and F_SIZE). Following previous studies, we 
control for variables expected to affect audit fees. Board size (BD_SIZE) is likely to be 
positively associated with audit fees (Huang et al., 2014). Boards with independent directors 
(BD_IND) are more concerned about their reputation and demand incremental audit effort 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Zaman et al., 2011). Similarly, more diligent boards (BD_MEET) seek 
higher levels of transparency by demanding a comprehensive external audit (Carcello et al., 
2002; Zaman et al., 2011). Audit committee size (ADC_SIZE), audit committee independence 
(ADC_IND) and the number of audit committee meetings (ADC_MEET) are expected to lead 
to higher audit fees (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009; Vafeas & Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al., 
2011). Consistently with the findings of Huang et al. (2014), firms with female CEOs 
(FEM_CEO) and CEO duality (DUAL) are likely to be positively associated with audit fees. 
Furthermore, long tenure (CEO_TEN) is another indication of CEO power and the CEO’s 
influence on organizational decisions. It is therefore interesting to study the influence of CEO 
tenure on audit fees. Ownership structure may have a significant impact on audit fees (Chan, 
Ezzamel, & Gwilliam 1993; Mitra et al., 2007; Srinidhi, He, & Firth, 2014; Barroso et al., 
2016). To study the effect of ownership structure, we consider both family (FAM_OWN) and 
institutional ownership (INST_OWN). Because they are going to be on the board of directors, 
family and institutional shareholders may have full access to private information and are less 
prone to use auditing services that may result in lower audit fees (Barroso et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, we expect both FAM_OWN and INST_OWN to be negatively associated with 
demand for audit effort, measured by audit fees. 
Consistently with the research of Audousset-Coulier (2015), we anticipate a positive 
relationship between non-audit fees (NONAUD_FEE) and audit fees (AF). For auditor tenure 
(AUD_TEN), we make no directional prediction because it may be positively or negatively 
associated with audit fees (Lai et al., 2017), depending on client-related factors. For example, 
 
6 The Shannon diversity index is calculated as – ∑ Pi
𝑛
𝑖=1  ln(Pi) where Pi is the percentage of board members in each 
category (two: male/female) and n is the total number of board members. The Blau diversity index is measured as 
1 – ∑ P𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  where Pi is the percentage of board members in each category (two: male/female) and n is the total 
number of board members. 
7 The concept of director independence in France is not far from Anglo-Saxon practices. The following definition 
is provided in the MEDEF-AFEP report of July 1999: "A director is independent of the corporation's management 
when he or she has no relationship of any kind whatsoever with the corporation or its group which might risk 
coloring his or her judgment”. Accordingly, current executives, former and retired executives and persons who 
are related to the founding family or to executive directors are considered as insider directors. 
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the auditor may have an in-depth (lower) understanding of an established (new) client’s 
accounts. Additionally, firms audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG) pay higher audit fees (Chan et 
al., 1993; Huang et al., 2014; Peel & Makepeace, 2012; Zaman et al., 2011; Kacer et al., 2018) 
and, due to the superior quality of audit services provided, reinforce their competitive advantage 
over non-Big 4 auditors through audit pricing (Zhang, Xu, Tong, & Ye, 2018). Audit fees will 
therefore be higher for firms audited by Big 4 audit firms. Audit planning and risk assessment 
are two major factors defining audit fees. Firms with a higher level of risk require more audit 
effort, resulting in higher audit fees. Similarly, firms that have a higher level of leverage (LEV) 
or report a net loss (LOSS) in the preceding year may reveal a higher level of risk and require 
incremental audit effort (Carcello et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2017; Zaman et al., 
2011). We consider Tobin’s Q (TOBIN) to control for financial performance. Financially sound 
firms are perceived as being less risky. Thus we expect a negative association between Tobin’s 
Q and audit fees. We also expect a positive link between research and development expenditure 
(R&D) and audit fees. Firms with foreign operations (FOR_ASSETS) are more complex and 
require greater audit effort (Lai et al., 2017). Similarly, audit fees will be higher for cross-listed 
firms (CROSS). In line with the risk assessment argument, a positive relationship is expected 
between the levels of market risk (BETA) and audit fees. Firms with higher levels of receivables 
and inventories (REC&INV) are more complicated and require greater audit effort from external 
auditors, resulting in higher audit fees. Finally, large firms (F_SIZE) undertake more 
transactions and auditors require more time to audit their financial records. For this reason, 
large firms pay higher audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Chan et al., 1993; Zaman et al., 2011). 
We finally control for the quota law implemented in 2012 (QUOTA), which impose quotas for 
the gender balance of company boards. This variable equals 1 after the implementation of the 
quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise.  
6. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample. In our sample, the mean amount of 
total audit fees paid by client firms is €6,939K. Audit fees ranges from €45.86K to a maximum 
of €53.4M, while the amount of audit fees paid by half (median) of the sampled firms is 
€3672K, indicating broad disparity in the amount paid for audit fees. The mean value of non-
audit fees paid by French firms is €586.85K with a maximum of €35.51M. With regard to board 
gender diversity, our results show that French firms appoint about two female directors 
(NBFEM_BD) and the mean proportion of female directors (PRFEM_BD) is 18.40%. For the 
other two proxies for board gender diversity, we report a mean of 0.253 for the Shannon index 
and a mean of 0.384 for the Blau index. The means of these two proxies for board gender 
diversity are slightly higher than those reported by Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) for a sample of 
333 UK companies listed in 2012 (0.218 and 0.348, respectively). The mean value of the 
proportion of female independent directors (PRFEM_IND) is 10.24%, and 19.26% of audit 
committee members are female (PRFEM_ADC). On average (mean), sample firm-years are 
audited by at least one BIG auditor (1.40); while the 25th and the 50th percentiles of Big auditors 
are 1. The mean auditor tenure (AUD_TEN) is about 12 years, with a maximum of 34 years. 
The average (mean) board size (BD_SIZE) of our sample firms is about 12 members and 
47.17% of directors are independent (BD_IND). In addition, our sample firms’ boards arrange 
7.14 meetings (BD_MEET) per year, with a maximum of 30 meetings per year.8 Table 1 shows 
that audit committees are composed of three to four members on average (ADC_SIZE) with an 
average independence rate (ADC_IND) of 68.82%. The average number of meetings 
 
8 Based on a sample of non-financial French listed companies during the period 2004-2008, Maraghni and Nekhili 
(2014) also report significant differences in the number of annual board meetings, which ranges from 2 to 29. 
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(ADC_MEET) is 4.65. The range of frequencies observed in the sample extends from one single 
meeting to 19 meetings, reflecting significant differences in audit committee diligence.9 
CEO/Chairperson duality (DUAL) is 58.14% and mean value of CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) is 
almost 8 years. Only 1.81% of firm-year observations have female CEOs (FEM_CEO). With 
regard to ownership structure, the results in Table 1 show that the mean percentage of family 
and institutional ownership is 25.91 and 25.82, respectively. Regarding family ownership, 
Nekhili, Nagati, Chitioui and Rebolledo (2017) report similar results for the largest French 
companies of the 120 SBF index between 2001 and 2010 (26.67%).10 The mean (median) of 
leverage (LEV) is 24.28 (14.61%). Tobin’s Q is higher than unity (1.21). On average, 13.14% 
of firms report a loss in the preceding year. Research and development (R&D) expenditure is 
2.77% of total sales on average. The mean value of assets in other countries (FOR_ASSETS) is 
20.13%. The mean (median) value of REC&INV is 13.62 (16.33%), whereas on average, the 
percentage of cross-listing is 24.46. Finally, F_SIZE is 19.07 billion euros.  
 [Please insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 confirms the propensity for French companies to have more female directors. 
Clearly, the percentage of female directors (Column 2) grew significantly over the years. This 
trend is more pronounced from 2012 because of the enactment of the quota law in 2011. 
Interestingly, the trend is also observed for female insider directors (Column 3) as well as for 
female independent directors (Column 4) and female audit committee members (Column 6). 
Interestingly too, the trends of female insider directors and female independent directors are 
inversely proportional. More specifically, since the enactment of the quota law in 2011, female 
insider directors give way to female independent directors, giving evidence to the preference of 
French firms for more active monitoring role of female directors in a mandatory context. 
Similarly, over the years, the increase in the proportion of female audit committee members 
(Column 6) changes in the same way as the increase in the proportion of female board directors 
(Column 2). At the same time, the evolution of board size (Column 1) and audit committee size 
(Column 5) remains quasi-steady and does not change to a great extent over time, albeit 
significantly. These findings suggest that the appointment of new female directors to the board 
(audit committee) did not occur by increasing the size of the board size (audit committee) but 
principally by replacing male directors. To assess statistically the occurrence of trends for 
female directorship, we carried out a Mann-Kendall non-parametric test for trend analysis. The 
null hypothesis of no trend over time is rejected for all variables.   
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
The results of the Pearson correlation analysis and variance inflation factors (VIF) of all 
variables considered in this study are given in Table 3. The correlation and VI factors of all 
variables are within the allowed limits. Thus our sample does not suffer from multicollinearity 
issues that could influence the results. It is, however, noteworthy that female representation 
variables are positively and significantly correlated with each other. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
9 Maraghni and Nekhili (2014) argue that, despite the fact that audit committee meetings should be aligned with 
the accounting cycle, many French audit committees do not meet more frequently than required by their charter. 
10 For a larger sample of French listed companies including smaller firms, the proportion of family ownership is 
significantly higher. Nekhili et al. (2018) report a proportion of family ownership of 36.84% for French companies 
of the CAC All-Shares index listed on Euronext Paris (whose annual trading volume exceeds 5% of their share 
capital) over the period 2001-2010, highlighting the fact that the French stock market is dominated by family-
controlled firms. 
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6.2. Propensity Score Matching 
The potential impact of gender diversity may arise because of firm-specific variables that 
concurrently affect both the appointment of female directors and audit fees. It would not, 
therefore, be a judicious choice to analyze all firms directly, neglecting firm-specific 
differences. We utilize the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to control for firm-level 
characteristics, as developed by (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This approach is being 
increasingly used in accounting research to evaluate treatment effects (Peel & Makepeace, 
2012). We match firms with a high proportion of female directors to a set of control firms with 
a low proportion of female directors whose characteristics are approximately similar (the closest 
forecast propensity score) to firms with gender-diverse boards. Accordingly, we derive a 
dummy variable to represent a high proportion of female directors, which takes the value 1 for 
firm-year observations with a proportion of female directors greater than the median (15.38%), 
and 0 otherwise. We apply a condition on the highest propensity caliper to rule out the 
likelihood of poor matching by adjusting caliper distance to 0.01 without replacement.11 By 
doing so, we have a matched sample comprising 914 observations: 457 treatment and 457 
control cases. In Table 4, the differences between control variables decrease in magnitude and 
are not significant in comparison to the unmatched sample. Finally, we have a sample 
comprising firms with similar firm-specific characteristics. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
6.3. Test of H1a and H1b 
To test H1a and H2a, we use four different proxies of board gender diversity (i.e., the 
proportion of female directors (PRFEM_BD), the number of female directors (NBFEM_BD), 
the Shannon index (SHAN_BD) and the Blau index (BLAU_BD)). Based on the PSM sample, 
In order to address the different sources of endogeneity, our main estimation approach is the 
system GMM method suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). For completeness, Table 5 
reports the results of the OLS estimation, the fixed effect estimation, and the system GMM 
estimation. While the signs of the coefficient of the OLS and system GMM estimations are the 
same, the significance of some coefficients differs markedly. For our variable of interest 
(PRFEM_BD), the estimate is higher in significance and magnitude. System GMM reduces the 
risk of biased estimators caused by the heterogeneity effect, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity (Bennouri et al., 2018; Kacer et al., 2018; Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016; 
Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). Accordingly, our discussion focuses on the results of the 
system GMM estimations. Table 6 shows the results of the system GMM regression analysis 
of the other proxies of board gender diversity (i.e., the number of female directors 
(NBFEM_BD), the Shannon index (SHAN_BD) and the Blau index (BLAU_BD)). Results are 
unchanged from the one observed in Table 5 for the proportion of female directors.12  
Our findings are consistent with the argument that women are stricter monitors, strengthen 
internal control systems, produce high quality earnings, and enhance the quality of financial 
reporting (Abbott et al., 2012; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Barua et al., 2010; García-Sánchez et 
al., 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Srinidhi et al., 2011), thereby reducing the demand for external audit 
assurance, and de facto the audit fees paid to incumbent auditors. Ittonen et al. (2010) offer an 
alternative explanation for the negative correlation between gender diversity and audit fees. 
They argue that auditors may be willing to limit the scope of their audit on account of women’s 
 
11 Matching without replacement ensures that a treated case will be matched with only one control observation. 
12 In untabulated results, we find that the impact of each proxy of board gender diversity (i.e., PRFEM_BD, 
NBFEM_BD, SHAN_BD, and BLAU_BD) on audit fees is not significant for the OLS and the fixed effect 
estimations. Tables are available upon request. 
18 
superior monitoring skills and risk-averse approach, leading to lower audit fees for firms with 
gender diverse boards. Overall, these results highlight the significant influence of women on 
the effectiveness and the quality of the board’s monitoring, resulting in the reduction of effort 
and resources dedicated to the audit of financial statements. Thus H1b is confirmed and H1a is 
rejected. 
In line with prior research (Audousset-Coulier, 2015; Carcello et al., 2002; Chan et al., 
1993; Huang et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2017), we find that the coefficients of our control variables 
(NONAUD_FEE, AUDIT_TEN, BD_SIZE, BD_IND, BD_MEET, FOR_ASSETS, REC&INV, 
CROSS & F_SIZE) are significant and in the expected direction. Audit committee size 
(ADC_SIZE) and audit committee independence (ADC_IND) are more likely to affect 
negatively and significantly the fees paid to auditors. Audit committee characteristics may 
reduce the perceived audit risk and, in turn, decrease the fees paid to external auditors (Ittonen 
et al., 2010). According to our prediction, FAM_OWN, INST_OWN and LOSS are negatively 
and significantly associated with audit fees. For the remaining variables (BIG, ADC_MEET, 
DUAL, FEM_CEO, CEO_TEN, LEV, TOBIN & R&D), we do not find any significant 
relationship with audit fees. 
[Please insert Tables 5, 6] 
6.4. Test of H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b 
According to H2a (H2b) and H3a (H3b), we expect female independent directors 
(PRFEM_IND) and female audit committee members (PRFEM_ADC) to have a positive 
(negative) relationship with audit fees, since women as independent and as audit committee 
members enhance the monitoring ability of the board and audit committee, thereby increasing 
(reducing) the need for assurance provided by external auditors in terms of audit effort. By way 
of comparison, we also consider the proportion of female insider directors (PRFEM_INS). As 
in the earlier test, we first use the PSM procedure for each proxy of board (audit committee) 
gender diversity (i.e., PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND and PRFEM_ADC).13 For each proxy, we 
derive a dummy variable to represent a high proportion of female directors (audit committee 
members), according to its median. Tables 7, 8 and 9 report pre- and post-match pairwise 
differences of control variables with regard to each matched variable (PRFEM_INS, 
PRFEM_IND and PRFEM_ADC, respectively). Results show that post-match pairwise 
differences between treatment and control groups decrease in magnitude with respect to the 
pre-match sample and become statistically non-significant. Importantly, when we compare 
firm-year observations with a high proportion of female independent directors to similar firm-
year observations with a low proportion of female independent directors via PSM technique, 
we find that treatment and control groups have an intrinsically significant difference in audit 
fees (Table 8). This is also the case when we match our sample based on the proportion of 
female audit committee members (Table 9). These results indicate that differences in audit fees 
are not solely due to the overlaps between the proportion of female directors and the firms’ 
other characteristics. 
[Please insert Tables 7, 8 & 9 here] 
Models in Table 10 include QUOTA as a control variable. In this table, we report the results 
of the impact of the proportion of female board directors (Model 1), the proportion of female 
insider directors (Model 2), the proportion of female independent directors (Model 3) and the 
proportion of female audit committee members (Model 4) on audit fees, respectively. With the 
 
13 As in Lai et al. (2017), we eliminate firm-years observations with all-male audit committees in the matching 
procedure for gender-diverse audit committees. 
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exception of Model 3, the effect of the coefficient of the implementation of gender quota law 
(QUOTA) on audit fees (AUD_FEE) is negative. The regression results of Table 10 indicate 
that the coefficient estimates for PRFEM_IND (Model 3) and PRFEM_ADC (Model 4) are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, thus confirming H2b and H3b and rejecting 
H2a and H3a. Nevertheless, the result of Model 2 in Table 10 shows that the proportion of 
female insider directors (PRFEM_INS) is likely to influence positively the external audit efforts 
as measured by audit fees. These results confirm the role played by female independent 
directors and female audit committee members in improving board monitoring effectiveness. 
Female independent directors and female audit committee members may considerably reduce 
the incidence of financial reporting problems and enhance the integrity of internal control and 
internal audit procedures, resulting in a decrease of the auditor’s assessment of risk and in 
lowering audit fees paid to incumbent auditors (Harjoto et al., 2015; Ittonen et al., 2010). 
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
6.5. Test of H4 
H4 states that the gender quota law may strengthen the relationship between board (audit 
committee) gender diversity and audit fees. We test this proposition by using a difference-in-
difference technique. We introduce a pre- and post-quota control variable (QUOTA) that equals 
1 after the adoption of the quota law reform in 2011, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate 
Equation 2 on the PSM sample, which includes the main effects of each treatment variable (i.e., 
PRFEM_BD, PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND and PRFEM_ADC) and QUOTA on audit fees 
(AUD_FEE).  
𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛼3𝑄𝑈𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛼4(𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑈𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑡) + 𝛼5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
where TREATMENT takes the value of PRFEM_BD, PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND and 
PRFEM_ADC, respectively. 𝜀 is the error term and the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 stand for firm and 
year, respectively. Table 11 reports the result of the system GMM estimation with four different 
specifications of Equation (2) (Models 1, 2, 3 & 4). Since we are measuring the marginal effect 
of gender board (audit committee) diversity on audit fees (AUD_FEE) in the post-quota period, 
the test of importance here is the joint test of the sum of the coefficients on each treatment 
variable and the interaction term (TREATMENT*QUOTA). The results of Table 11 show that 
the joint coefficient (α2 + α4) is negative and significant for the proportion of female directors 
(PRFEM_BD), for the proportion of independent directors (PRFEM_IND), and for the 
proportion of female audit committee members (PRFEM_ADC). This finding suggests that the 
negative relation between the presence of women as independent (Model 3) and as audit 
committee members (Model 4), on the one side, and audit fees, on the other side, gets stronger 
after the implementation of the gender quota law. Nevertheless, the joint coefficient for female 
insider directors (PRFEM_INS) is positive and significant. It follows that H4 is partially 
confirmed. Regarding audit fees paid to incumbent auditors, the effectiveness of the gender 
quota law, while breaking the glass ceiling, stems from boosting the appointment of women as 
independent directors and as audit committee members and not from increasing the number and 
the proportion of female insider directors. These results give support to French companies in 
their decision, since the implementation of the gender quota law in 2012, to privilege the new 
appointment of female as independent directors and as audit committee members rather than 
their appointment as insider directors (Table 2). Our findings are inconsistent with Choudhury 
(2015) and Smith (2018) that mandatory reforms may force organizations to hire less qualified 
female directors and may promote female tokenism on boards.  
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 [Please insert Table 11 here] 
6.6. Supplementary Analysis 
The firm size effect 
We follow Aldamen et al. (2018) in order to investigate the interplay of female directorships 
(audit committee memberships) and firm size. To this end, we derive a new dummy variable 
(SIZE_DUM), which takes the value 1 for larger firms with total assets greater than the median 
and 0 otherwise. For each treatment variable (i.e., PRFEM_BD, PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND 
and PRFEM_ADC), we introduce its interaction term with SIZE_DUM in the model. Table 12 
shows that the impact of SIZE_DUM on audit fees is positive and significant, suggesting that 
the complex nature of large firms leads to relatively higher audit fees. With regard to treatment 
variables related to board diversity (i.e., PRFEM_BD, PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND), the 
interaction term with SIZE_DUM is strongly negative and significant. These results indicate 
that firm size strengthens the negative relationship between the proportion of female (insiders 
or independent) directors and audit fees. As shown by the joint tests, the marginal effects of 
appointing female directors (Model 1), female insider directors (Model 2) and female 
independent directors (Model 3) are also strongly negative and significant. For the treatment 
variable related to the representation of women on the audit committee (PRFEM_ADC), we do 
not find, in contrast to Aldamen et al. (2018), a significant relationship between the interaction 
term (PRFEM_ADC* SIZE_DUM) and audit fees (Model 4). Furthermore, the joint effect is 
not significantly stronger than the interaction effect. This result may be explained by the fact 
that the proportion of women on the audit committee does not vary much with firm size.14 
[Please insert Table 12] 
The Impact of Gender Diverse Boards (Audit Committees) on Non-audit Fees 
It is generally accepted that non-audit fees may compromise the independence of auditors (e.g., 
Ashbaugh, Lafond, & Mayhew, 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Frankel, 
Johnson, & Nelson, 2002). Accordingly, it is interesting to examine whether women on the 
board (audit committee) reinforces trust in auditors’ independence by lowering non-audit fees. 
We test these predictions by replacing audit fees (AUDIT_FEE) in Equation 2 by non-audit fees 
(NAUDIT_FEE). In Table 13, the level of non-audit fees is affected negatively by each 
treatment variable (i.e., PRFEM_BD, PRFEM_INS, PRFEM_IND and PRFEM_ADC). 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the gender quota law is likely to alter these relationships. 
The results provided in Table 14 show that, after the implementation of the gender quota law, 
the effect of the proportion of female insider directors (PRFEM_INS*QUOTA) and the effect 
of the proportion of female audit committee members (PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA) turn to be 
positive and significant. The negative effect of female independent directors 
(PRFEM_IND*QUOTA) on non-audit fees is, however, strengthened after the implementation 
of the gender quota law (α4 = –2.758; t = –2.79). Importantly, the marginal effect of appointing 
female independent directors after the quota law as provided by the difference-indifference test 
(PRFEM_IND + PRFEM_IND*QUOTA) is strongly negative (α2 + α4 = –2.370) and significant 
(t = 3.42). These results suggest that only female independent directors are more likely to be 
 
14 These results should, however, be treated with caution since our sample consists only of the largest firms in the 
SBF 120 index. 
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concerned about the independence of external auditors.15 
[Please insert Tables 13 & 14 here] 
The Incremental Effect of Gender Diversity in the Audit Committee 
Following Lai et al. (207), we investigate whether the effects of having female audit committee 
members on audit fees and non-audit fees are incremental to having female directors on the 
board only. To this end, we create a new variable PRFEM_BDONLY defined as the proportion 
of female directors who are only on the board and do not participate in the audit committee 
compared to total numbers of board directors. We include both the variables PRFEM_ADC and 
PRFEM_BDONLY in the audit fee (AUD_FEE) and the non-audit fee (NAUD_FEE) models. 
The results of Table 15 show that both variables are negatively and significantly associated with 
audit fees. Nevertheless, when consisting of non-audit fees (NAUD_FEE), PRFEM_ADC and 
PRFEM_BDONLY act in the opposite direction. PRFEM_ADC is negatively and significantly 
associated with non-audit fees and PRFEM_BDONLY is positively and significantly associated 
with non-audit fees. 
 [Please insert Table 15 here] 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines whether gender-diverse boards (audit committees) affect the demand for 
audit effort, measured by audit fees. Motivated by the documented gender differences in ethics, 
risk aversion, decision making, and overconfidence, and recent findings in the corporate 
governance literature, we hypothesize that gender diverse boards may affect the level of fees 
paid to external auditors for audit services. A recently published study by Lai et al. (2017) 
discusses the relationship between board gender diversity and audit fees. This study broadens 
our current knowledge of the role of female directors by examining a French setting, which has 
a different governance and legal structure in terms of ownership and institutional background 
than the U.S. (Lai et al., 2017). Along similar lines, Hay et al. (2006) highlight a gap in the 
existing audit literature and recommend investigating the influence of ownership structure and 
local institutional factors on audit fees. During the two last decades, board gender diversity 
reforms have been adopted worldwide, with the aim of increasing female representation on 
boards of directors. Following the example of Norway, France opted in January 2011 for a hard 
quota law, meaning that non-complying firms are subject to explicit sanctions. Nevertheless, as 
well as in the rest of the countries which adopted quota law, this reform does not provide any 
guidelines as to the roles that should be assigned to female directors. Going forward, we then 
consider the influence of gender quota legislation. Doing so, allows us to provide further 
insights into the relationship between gender diverse boards (audit committees) and audit fees 
in voluntary and mandatory contexts.  
We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of French listed firms 
between the years 2002 and 2017 to examine the relation between gender diverse boards and 
audit fees, by highlighting the role of gender quota regulation in promoting the efficiency of 
the board’s decision-making. In contrast to the findings reported by Lai et al. (2017), our results 
provide evidence that gender diverse boards (audit committees) reduce the demand for 
incremental audit effort due to their superior monitoring skills, resulting in lower audit fees. 
These results are in line with the supply side argument and underline the role played by female 
independent directors and female audit committee members in improving board monitoring 
 
15 In a separate test, we consider the proportion of independent female audit committee members compared to the 
total number of audit committee members. The results are similar to those obtained for female independent board 
directors. 
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effectiveness. The appointment of women to the board as independent directors and as audit 
committee members may therefore decrease the auditor’s assessment of risk and reduce audit 
fees by enhancing the integrity of internal control and internal audit procedures (Harjoto et al., 
2015; Ittonen et al., 2010). The enactment of the gender quota law in January 2011 made our 
focus on France even more interesting by allowing us to study the implications of both 
voluntary and mandatory board gender-diversity for French firms. In our study, we use the 
difference-in-difference technique to test whether gender quota law moderates the relationship 
between board (audit committee) gender diversity and audit fees. Our results show that the 
advantage of the gender quota law is not related to the increase of the number and the proportion 
of female directors as a whole, but rather to the appointment of women as independent directors 
and as audit committee members. These results vindicate French companies which, since the 
implementation of the gender quota law in 2012, decided to promote the number and the 
proportion of both female independent directors and female audit committee members and to 
reduce the number and the proportion of female insider directors. Additionally, we find that the 
implementation of the gender quota law strengthened the negative relationship between the 
proportions of female independent directors on board, as well as on audit committee, and the 
magnitude of non-audit fees. In contrast, the effect of the proportion of female insider directors 
(female audit committee members) on the non-audit fees turns to be positive and significant 
after the implementation of the gender quota law. These results provide evidence on the 
importance of independence for female board (audit committee) directors to assert their 
monitoring skills and to achieve better audit outcomes. 
In spite of its incremental contributions, this study has a number of limitations. We conclude 
that the lower audit fees for companies with gender-diverse boards are due to the accuracy of 
their internal control systems and financial reporting process. This conclusion does not rule out 
other possible interpretations, for example that lower audit fees may result from the ability of 
female directors to negotiate with external auditors. Further studies are called for to investigate 
the mechanism by which female directors (audit committees’ members) influence audit fees. 
Audit partners and audit firms’ characteristics may have a significant impact on audit fees 
(Hardies, Breesch, & Branson, 2015). Likewise, audit firms with higher industry specialization 
are more likely to earn an audit fee premium. Focusing on the French context, Nekhili, Javed 
and Chtioui (2018) find that gender, experience, industry expertise, and careers of engagement 
partners are important determinants of audit fees. In a joint audit setting, Nekhili et al. (2018) 
argue that the interaction between engagement partners within the joint pair composition should 
also be considered. Although we control for variables that would affect audit fees, our study is 
limited by the degree to which audit fee reflect audit effort, because it omits other assurance 
services that may be purchased by the client organization in separate transactions. Our study is 
also limited to the case of the largest French firms listed in the SBF 120 stock market index. A 
potential avenue for future research would be to determine whether our findings are also 
consistent for smaller firms. 
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Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 






AUD_FEE (Thousands of euros) 6939.32 8050.05 45.86 53400 1334.75 3672 9718.5 
NAUD_FEE (Thousands of euros) 586.85 1683.01 0 35510 6 200 641.3 
PRFEM_BD 18.40% 15.50% 0 66.67% 0 15.38% 30% 
NBFEM_BD  2.19 1.98 0 8 0 1 3 
SHAN_BD 0.253 0.179 0 0.627 0.077 0.260 0.420 
BLAU_BD 0.384 0.253 0 0.723 0 0.429 0.611 
PRFEM_INS 8.16% 9.98% 0 50% 0 6.25% 13.33% 
NBFEM_INS 0.93 1.15 0 6 0 1 1 
PRFEM_IND 10.24% 13.37% 0 66.67% 0 0 18.18% 
NBFEM_IND  1.26 1.67 0 8 0 0 2 
PRFEM_ADC  19.26% 23.00% 0 100% 0 0 33.33% 
NBFEM_ADC  0.74 0.91 0 5 0 0 1 
BIG 1.40 0.585 0 2 1 1 1 
AUD_TEN (Number of years) 11.97 6.68 0 38.50 6.5 11 16 
BD_SIZE (Number of directors) 11.84 3.68 3 24 9 12 14 
BD_IND 47.17% 22.51% 0 100% 33.33% 45.45% 60% 
BD_MEET (Number of meetings) 7.14 3.36 1 30 5 7 9 
ADC_SIZE 3.77 1.10 0 10 3 4 4 
ADC_IND 68.82% 28.12% 0 100% 50% 66.67% 100% 
ADC_MEET (Number of meetings) 4.65 2.19 1 19 3 4 6 
FEM_CEO 1.81% 13.15% 0 1 0 0 0 
DUAL 58.14% 49.38% 0 1 0 1 1 
CEO_TEN (Number of years) 8.05 7.34 0 51 3 6 10 
FAM_OWN 25.91% 26.45% 0 95.19% 0 18.48% 47.67% 
INST_OWN 25.82% 28.96% 0 95.31% 0 11.96% 43.05% 
LEV 24.28% 14.61% 0.10% 66.55% 14.00% 22.89% 33.16% 
TOBIN 1.21 1.08 0.22 7.03 0.63 0.89 1.35 
LOSS 13.14% 34.12% 0 1 0 0 0 
R&D 2.77% 5.61% 0 34.63% 0 0 3.32% 
FOR_ASSETS 20.13% 30.03% 0 94.41% 0 0 39.23% 
REC&INV 13.62% 16.33% 0 65.31% 0.65% 8.81% 23.69% 
CROSS 24.46% 43.05% 0 1 0 0 0 
F_SIZE (Total assets in billions of euros) 19.07 33.04 0.01 278.94 2.06 5.81 23.25 
This table reports descriptive statistics for audit fees, non-audit fees, female directorship and control variables for a sample containing French firms of SBF 120 index. The final 
sample contains unbalanced panel data for 97 French firms for the period between 2002 and 2017. AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE 
is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to total directors; NBFEM_BD is the total number of female directors; 
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SHAN_BD is the Shannon diversity index; BLAU_BD is the Blau diversity index; PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board 
members; NBFEM_INS is the number of female insider board directors; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of female non-executive independent directors to total number of board 
directors; NBFEM_IND is the number of female non-executive independent directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of 
audit committee directors; NBFEM_ADC is the number of female audit committee members; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 
1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the 
auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; 
BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee 
meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN 
is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, 
scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; 
FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 




Descriptive statistics by year for board size, the proportion of female insider directors, the proportion of female independent directors , audit 
committee size, and the proportion of women on audit committees 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 






ADC_SIZE PRFEM_ADC  
(%) 
2002 11.19 6.40 5.75 0.65 3.45 2.90 
2003 11.40 6.91 6.19 0.72 3.48 3.59 
2004 11.44 7.44 6.77 0.67 3.49 4.49 
2005 11.45 8.21 7.35 0.86 3.55 5.72 
2006 11.18 8.61 7.64 0.97 3.62 6.76 
2007 11.27 7.95 5.34 2.61 3.57 8.76 
2008 11.59 7.98 4.94 3.05 3.71 9.72 
2009 11.54 9.12 5.47 3.65 3.80 11.47 
2010 12.06 12.80 6.58 6.22 3.83 16.10 
2011 12.16 17.92 8.59 9.33 3.85 18.96 
2012 12.21 21.16 8.95 12.21 3.88 23.46 
2013 12.15 26.42 10.64 15.98 3.95 28.36 
2014 12.44 31.15 10.46 20.49 4.01 32.66 
2015 12.20 34.62 10.78 23.84 3.95 34.21 
2016 12.44 40.29 12.05 28.24 3.97 40.79 
2017 12.48 40.22 12.11 28.11 3.98 40.80 
Total 11.84 18.40 8.16 10.24 3.77 19.26 
Analysis of variance for mean  
difference test : F-value (p-value) 
1.58 (0.065)* 162.76 (0.000)*** 6.32 (0.000)*** 126.83 (0.000)*** 2.79 (0.000)*** 43.87 (0.000)*** 
Mann–Kendall test: Z-value (p- value): 4.56 (0.000)*** 29.12 (0.000)*** 8.17 (0.000)*** 29.17 (0.000)*** 6.61 (0.000)*** 22.13 (0.000)*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics by year for the number of board directors (Column 1), the proportion of female directors (Column 2), the proportion of female insider 
directors (Column 3), the proportion of female independent directors (Column 4), the number of audit committee members (Column 5), and the proportion of women on audit 




Pairwise correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 
1. AUD_FEE 1.000             
2. NAUD_FEE 0.551* 1.000            
3. FEMDIR_PER 0.044 –0.015 1.000          2.61 
4. FEMDIR_NUM 0.257* 0.101* 0.900* 1.000         2.65 
5. SHAN_BD 0.055 –0.018 0.961* 0.881* 1.000         
6. BLAU_BD 0.068* –0.016 0.933* 0.855* 0.991* 1.000        
7. PRFEM_INS –0.109* –0.133* 0.535* 0.413* 0.563* 0.561* 1.000       
8. PRFEM_IND 0.136* 0.084* 0.774* 0.750* 0.708* 0.675* –0.118* 1.000      
9. PRFEM_ADC –0.037 –0.112* 0.613* 0.582* 0.604* 0.583* 0.348* 0.462* 1.000     
10. QUOTA 0.092* –0.015 0.706* 0.712* 0.709* 0.686* 0.220* 0.667* 0.513* 1.000   2.47 
11. BIG 0.346* 0.241* –0.027 0.058 –0.033 –0.026 –0.083* 0.031 –0.059 0.022 1.000  1.31 
12. AUDIT_TEN 0.169* 0.102* 0.246* 0.316* 0.232* 0.222* 0.003  0.288* 0.178* 0.340* 0.117* 1.000 1.42 
13. BD_SIZE  0.536* 0.348* 0.004 0.332* 0.033 0.056 –0.154* 0.120* 0.016 0.135* 0.279* 0.235* 2.02 
14. BD_IND 0.274* 0.140* 0.142* 0.130* 0.124* 0.121* –0.167* 0.292* 0.072* 0.220* 0.123* 0.119* 2.46 
15. BD_MEET 0.116* 0.055 0.122* 0.106* 0.130* 0.127* 0.044  0.113* 0.077* 0.070* 0.077* –0.041 1.32 
16. ADC_SIZE 0.323* 0.174* 0.080* 0.196* 0.092* 0.100* 0.007  0.088* 0.102* 0.146* 0.030 0.110* 1.50 
17. ADC_IND 0.106* –0.019 0.152* 0.119* 0.144* 0.138* –0.060  0.220* 0.119* 0.195* 0.112* 0.174* 1.92 
18. ADC_MEET 0.390* 0.134* 0.163* 0.214* 0.168* 0.166* –0.021  0.205* 0.178* 0.210* 0.128* 0.103* 1.47 
19. DUAL –0.035 –0.071* 0.048 0.086* 0.057 0.056 0.038  0.029 0.061 0.094* 0.000 0.010 1.31 
20. CEO_TEN –0.083* –0.081* 0.171* 0.140* 0.146* 0.135* 0.114* 0.111* 0.172* 0.155* 0.028 0.131* 1.26 
21. FEM_CEO –0.238* –0.161* 0.055 –0.018 0.059 0.058 0.177* –0.068* 0.007 0.020 –0.053 0.014 1.22 
22. FAM_OWN –0.364* –0.187* –0.101* –0.144* –0.096* –0.100* 0.042  –0.151* –0.048 –0.054 –0.045 0.039 1.78 
23. INST_OWN 0.286* 0.240* 0.168* 0.232* 0.168* 0.168* –0.078* 0.256* 0.116* 0.194* 0.171* 0.092* 1.62 
24. LEV 0.093* 0.014 –0.040 –0.041 –0.041 –0.032 –0.111* 0.032 –0.005 –0.087* –0.028 0.008 1.17 
25. TOBIN –0.259* –0.076* 0.056 –0.025 0.029 0.018 0.045  0.031 0.067 0.013 –0.013 –0.055 1.29 
26. LOSS –0.085* –0.062 –0.030 –0.053 –0.043 –0.044 –0.038  –0.007 –0.019 –0.008 0.059 –0.005 1.17 
27. R&D –0.101* –0.044 –0.032 –0.056 –0.033 –0.043 –0.091* 0.034 0.017 0.062 0.011 0.009 1.16 
28. FOR_ASSETS –0.014 0.103* –0.199* –0.231* –0.206* –0.206* –0.112* –0.150* –0.221* –0.173* –0.093* –0.090* 1.25 
29. RECINV –0.139* –0.014 –0.169* –0.235* –0.169* –0.172* –0.033  –0.170* –0.232* –0.225* –0.013 –0.137* 1.21 
30. CROSS 0.418* 0.178* 0.002 0.064 –0.001 0.001 0.056 –0.038 0.062 –0.017 0.123* 0.017 1.35 




TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
13. BD_SIZE  1.000              
14. BD_IND 0.063 1.000            
15. BD_MEET –0.007 –0.008  1.000           
16. ADC_SIZE 0.347* 0.021  0.088* 1.000          
17. ADC_IND –0.062 0.584* –0.044 –0.116* 1.000         
18. ADC_MEET 0.202* 0.102* 0.405* 0.236* 0.151* 1.000        
19. DUAL 0.077* –0.152* 0.004 –0.001 –0.057 0.010 1.000       
20. CEO_TEN 0.005 –0.020  –0.021 –0.146* 0.158* –0.061 0.179* 1.000      
21. FEM_CEO –0.155* 0.019  0.070* –0.090* 0.071* –0.058 –0.021 0.123* 1.000     
22. FAM_OWN –0.193* –0.359* –0.201* –0.224* –0.162* –0.238* –0.014 0.079* 0.045  1.000    
23. INST_OWN 0.193* 0.380* 0.068* 0.255* 0.204* 0.144* 0.003 –0.020 –0.072* –0.465* 1.000   
24. LEV 0.013 0.037  0.105* 0.045 –0.043 0.045 –0.067* –0.123* –0.035  –0.117* 0.001 1.000  
25. TOBIN –0.177* –0.119* 0.038 –0.073* –0.052 –0.064 –0.123* 0.069* 0.025 0.195* –0.177* –0.068* 1.000 
26. LOSS –0.042 0.105* 0.106* 0.022 0.046 0.041 –0.002 –0.064 0.130* –0.144* 0.062 0.091* –0.011 
27. R&D –0.108* 0.008  0.098* –0.037 0.076* 0.078* –0.015 0.048 –0.017  0.069* –0.040 –0.083* 0.121* 
28. FOR_ASSETS –0.091* 0.093* –0.004 –0.078* 0.018 –0.067 –0.103* –0.062 –0.048  –0.003 –0.038 0.063 0.053 
29. RECINV –0.171* –0.064  0.018 –0.119* –0.028 –0.069* –0.115* –0.001 –0.066* 0.050 –0.160* –0.178* 0.067* 
30. CROSS 0.208* 0.171* 0.133* 0.141* 0.166* 0.236* –0.093* –0.093* –0.078* –0.221* 0.140* 0.032 –0.032 
31. F_SIZE 0.589* 0.201* 0.032 0.322* 0.071* 0.375* –0.010 –0.062 –0.225* –0.337* 0.277* 0.142* –0.300* 
 
TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 26 27 28 29 30 
26. LOSS 1.000     
27. R&D 0.084* 1.000    
28. FOR_ASSETS 0.042 0.013 1.000   
29. RECINV –0.049 0.014 0.248* 1.000  
30. CROSS 0.101* 0.112* –0.027  –0.102* 1.000 
31. F_SIZE –0.119* –0.093* –0.090* –0.194* 0.322* 
This table presents correlations and VIF scores of the different variables used in our study. AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE is the 
natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to total directors; NBFEM_BD is the total number of female directors; 
SHAN_BD is the Shannon diversity index; BLAU_BD is the Blau diversity index; PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board 
members; NBFEM_INS is the number of female insider board directors; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of female non-executive independent directors to total number of board 
directors; NBFEM_IND is the number of female non-executive independent directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of 
audit committee directors; NBFEM_ADC is the number of female audit committee members; QUOTA is a binary variable equal to 1 after the implementation of the quota law 
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reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if 
the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the 
total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; 
ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a 
female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at 
the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; 
LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; 
REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 




Mean difference test between firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors and firm-year observations with low proportion of 
female directors for entire and matched samples 
Variable 
 
Entire Sample   Matched Sample 
  FEM_BD 
 > 15.38% 
FEM_BD  
< 15.38% 
t-value Treatment Control t-value 
AUD_FEE (Thousands of euros) 7596.3 7765.2 0.36 6594.2 8207.1 2.77***a 
NAUD_FEE (Thousands of euros) 774.26 611.34 1.63 690.79 553.92 1.02a 
BIG 1.44 1.48 1.38 1.46 1.45 0.26 
AUD_TEN (Number of years) 13.71 11.10 7.26*** 12.307 12.184 0.28a 
BD_SIZE (Number of directors) 11.79 11.83 0.21 12.18 12.39 0.94a 
BD_IND 50.82% 45.68% 4.49*** 47.92% 47.31% 0.45 
BD_MEET (Number of meetings) 7.48 6.67 4.77*** 7.03 6.84 1.00a 
ADC_SIZE 3.84 3.68 2.79*** 3.74 3.78 0.60 
ADC_IND 71.36% 64.38% 5.16*** 67.36% 67.27% 0.05 
ADC_MEET (Number of meetings) 4.85 4.26 5.12*** 4.56 4.65 0.64a 
DUAL 59.82% 54.19% 2.08** 57.80% 56.46% 0.02 
CEO_TEN (Number of years) 9.08 6.75 6.36*** 7.91 7.27 1.38a 
FEM_CEO 3.04% 0.51% 3.78*** 1.57% 0.90 0.91 
FAM_OWN 23.90% 25.53% 1.16 25.73% 26.45% 0.42 
INST_OWN 30.74% 23.04% 4.87*** 25.51% 26.92% 0.75 
1. LEV 23.44% 25.10% 2.16** 24.20% 24.21% 0.01 
2. TOBIN 1.25 1.14 2.10** 1.23 1.19 0.53 
3. LOSS 11.96% 14.15% 1.78* 12.47% 12.25% 0.10 
4. R&D 2.59% 2.66% 0.23 2.74% 2.94% 0.55 
FOR_ASSETS 16.21% 27.37% 6.95*** 21.02% 20.42% 0.30 
REC&INV 12.03% 16.39% 4.88** 14.16% 13.71 0.42 
CROSS 24.52% 29.68% 2.12** 27.13% 27.35% 0.07 
F_SIZE (in billions of euros) 20.58 17.22 2.02** 19.12 20.61 0.36a 
Number of observations 783 705  457 457  
This table reports the mean difference between firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors and firm-year observations with high proportion of female 
directors before and after matching for audit fees and control variables between 2002 and 2017. Propensity score matching yields a matched sample consisting of 914 cases: 
457 treatment cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors) and 457 comparison cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female 
directors). AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BIG is an ordinal variable 
coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is 
the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-
executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee 
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members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the 
percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is 
the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; 
R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to 
total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural log of firm’s total assets. 




Regressions of audit fees on female directorship 






Model 3:  
System GMM 
Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE +     0.845*** 62.05 
PRFEM_BD + –0.334 –1.49 0.136 0.82 –0.675*** –14.10 
BIG + 0.066 1.51 0.149*** 3.37 0.002 0.14 
AUDIT_TEN ? –0.019 –0.47 0.034 1.04 0.032** 2.46 
NAUD_FEE + 0.076*** 9.28 0.014** 2.01 0.007*** 2.78 
BD_SIZE  + 0.339*** 4.05 0.055 0.73 0.097*** 3.72 
BD_IND + 0.610*** 4.62 –0.073 –0.77 0.054 1.54 
BD_MEET + 0.086* 1.77 0.037 1.13 0.025** 2.19 
ADC_SIZE + –0.008 –0.37 –0.006 –0.37 –0.010** –2.01 
ADC_IND + –0.148 –1.57 0.114* 1.74 –0.111*** –4.54 
ADC_MEET + 0.133** 2.16 0.203*** 4.83 –0.003 –0.22 
DUAL + –0.029 –0.72 –0.007 –0.27 0.005 0.52 
CEO_TEN + –0.004 –0.14 0.020 1.08 –0.001 –0.25 
FEM_CEO + –0.298 –1.47 –0.001 –0.00 0.024 0.90 
FAM_OWN + –0.335*** –3.41 0.231** 2.08 –0.118*** –4.39 
INST_OWN + –0.205*** –2.56 –0.116* –1.71 –0.112*** –6.51 
LEV + 0.293* 1.93 0.682*** 5.38 0.040 0.87 
TOBIN – –0.001 –0.02 –0.034* –1.92 0.002 0.53 
LOSS + –0.102* –1.80 –0.024 –0.63 –0.044*** –3.14 
R&D + –1.285*** –3.08 –0.263 –0.47 0.003 0.02 
FOR_ASSETS + –0.031 –0.46 –0.021 –0.43 0.077*** 3.30 
RECINV + –0.127 –1.01 0.185 1.49 0.065** 2.05 
CROSS + 0.510*** 9.88 –2.273*** –11.32 0.087*** 5.87 
F_SIZE + 0.481*** 20.23 0.247*** 8.13 0.074*** 7.86 
Intercept ? –0.549 –1.19 4.032*** 7.85 –0.035 –0.33 
Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (?)  Yes No Yes 
Number of obs.  914 914      856 
R-squared  81.28% 39.49%  
F (Prob > F)  64.70 (p = 0.000) 25.98 (p = 0.000) 8792.71 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –4.28 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –0.57 (p = 0.568) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 735.03 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 72.63 (p = 0.109) 
The table presents results of the OLS, the fixed effect, and the system GMM regressions of audit fees on the 
proportion of female directors for the matched sample. Matched sample analysis is carried out using the propensity 
score matching procedure (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Propensity score matching yields a matched sample 
consisting of 914 cases: 457 treatment cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors) and 
457 comparison cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors). AUD_FEE is the 
dependent variables and measured by the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag AUD_FEE is the 
one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to total 
directors; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is 
audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log 
of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees 
in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-
executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board 
meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit 
committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the 
number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by 
family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of 
financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the 
book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the 
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ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is 
the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural log of firm’s total assets. *, 





System GMM regressions of audit fees on the number of female directors, the Shannon 
diversity index and the Blau diversity index 
Variables Predicted  
sign 
Model 1:  
NBFEM_BD 
Model 2:  
SHAN_BD 
Model 3:  
BLAU_BD 
Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE + 0.840*** 66.34 0.851*** 56.85 0.853*** 55.08 
NBFEM_BD + –0.043*** –11.56     
SHAN_BD    –0.570*** –12.85   
BLAU_BD      –0.448*** –12.75 
BIG + 0.009 0.75 –0.010 –0.02 0.002 0.15 
AUDIT_TEN ? 0.028** 2.17 0.029** 2.10 0.028** 2.04 
NAUD_FEE + 0.008*** 3.43 0.008*** 3.12 0.008*** 3.17 
BD_SIZE  + 0.172*** 7.04 0.102*** 3.87 0.112*** 4.25 
BD_IND + 0.053* 1.91 0.038 1.07 0.036 0.90 
BD_MEET + 0.023** 2.18 0.027** 2.24 0.026** 2.06 
ADC_SIZE + –0.011** –2.35 –0.010* –1.82 –0.010 –1.74 
ADC_IND + –0.109*** –5.16 –0.113*** –4.57 –0.108*** –4.27 
ADC_MEET + –0.001 –0.02 –0.001 –0.09 –0.002 –0.15 
DUAL + 0.003 0.35 0.004 0.30 –0.004 –0.18 
CEO_TEN + –0.004 –0.60 –0.003 –0.41 –0.003 –0.48 
FEM_CEO + –0.010 –0.40 0.008 0.30 0.005 0.15 
FAM_OWN + –0.103*** –3.91 –0.106*** –4.09 –0.109*** –4.46 
INST_OWN + –0.104*** –6.44 –0.105*** –6.95 –0.113*** –7.24 
LEV + 0.019 0.44 0.034 0.75 0.023 0.50 
TOBIN – 0.001 0.17 –0.001 –0.29 –0.002 –0.31 
LOSS + –0.041*** –3.03 –0.045*** –3.06 –0.045*** –2.94 
R&D + –0.049 –0.48 0.012 0.10 –0.020 –0.16 
FOR_ASSETS + 0.073*** 3.66 0.079*** 3.53 0.074*** 3.56 
RECINV + 0.068** 2.36 0.062** 2.01 0.058* 1.81 
CROSS + 0.091*** 6.65 0.082*** 4.92 0.079*** 4.62 
F_SIZE + 0.075*** 9.05 0.071*** 7.13 0.070*** 6.96 
Intercept ? –0.208** –2.17 –0.016 –0.16 0.004 0.04 
Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs.       856      856      856 
F (Prob > F)  7560.65 (p = 0.000) 10314.97 (p = 0.000) 5714.69 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–
value): 
–4.26 (p = 0.000) –4.26 (p = 0.000) –4.23 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–
value): 
–0.55 (p = 0.585) –0.55 (p = 0.585) –0.60 (p = 0.551) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–
value): 
752.28 (p = 0.000) 752.28 (p = 0.000) 736.06 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–
value): 
72.62 (p = 0.110) 72.62 (p = 0.110) 71.05 (p = 0.135) 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of audit fees on the number of female directors, the 
Shannon diversity index and the Blau diversity index for the matched sample. Matched sample analysis is carried 
out using the propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Propensity score matching yields 
a matched sample consisting of 914 cases: 457 treatment cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of 
female directors) and 457 comparison cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female directors). 
AUD_FEE is the dependent variables and measured by the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag 
AUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; NBFEM_BD is the total number of female 
directors; SHAN_BD is the Shannon diversity index; BLAU_BD is the Blau diversity index; BIG is an ordinal 
variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor 
and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years 
of the auditors–client relationship; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE 
is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to 
total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total 
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number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO 
serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company 
before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the 
percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the 
stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; 
FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and 
inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and 
the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural log of firm’s total assets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 





Mean difference test between firm-year observations with high proportion of female insider directors and firm-year observations with low 
proportion of female insider directors for entire and matched samples 
Variable 
 
Entire Sample   Matched Sample 




 t-value Treatment  
 
Control t-value 
AUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 8099.3 7203.2 1.87* 7552.6 8592.5 1.68* 
NAUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 764.57 495.62 3.11*** 597.91 579.24 0.27 a 
BIG 1.48 1.45 0.94 1.54 1.51 0.96 
AUD_TEN (Number of years) 12.63 12.47 0.43 12.70 12.39 0.67 a 
BD_SIZE (Number of directors) 12.85 11.77 5.78*** 12.26 12.26 0.02 a 
BD_IND 45.45% 53.69% 7.30*** 51.20% 51.23% 0.02 
BD_MEET (Number of meetings) 6.89 7.08 1.13 7.09 7.08 0.08 a 
ADC_SIZE 3.87 3.72 2.35** 3.77 3.78 0.10 
ADC_IND 66.62% 72.17% 3.80*** 69.72% 71.27% 0.89 
ADC_MEET (Number of meetings) 4.62 4.72 0.85 4.76 4.81 0.34 a 
DUAL 58.70% 54.58% 1.46 55.31% 56.02% 0.20 
CEO_TEN (Number of years) 8.26 7.51 1.83* 7.88 7.55 0.67 a 
FEM_CEO 2.66% 0.70% 2.61*** 0.98% 1.05% 0.08 
FAM_OWN 26.19% 23.08% 2.12** 23.06% 23.80% 0.41 
INST_OWN 26.97% 28.53% 0.93 29.50% 29.97% 0.22 
5. LEV 23.47% 24.92% 1.85* 24.67% 24.93% 0.28 
6. TOBIN 1.16 1.20 0.64 1.15 1.16 0.12 
7. LOSS 12.68% 13.38% 0.36 14.57% 14.39% 0.07 
8. R&D 1.82% 3.64% 6.29*** 2.23% 2.73% 1.52 
FOR_ASSETS 18.52% 24.74% 3.58*** 24.74% 21.72% 1.36 
REC&INV 13.19% 14.46% 1.35 14.98% 13.51% 1.27 
CROSS 29.50% 23.24% 2.49** 24.94% 26.70% 0.56 
F_SIZE (in billions of euros) 23.78 14.81 4.71*** 17.35 18.27 0.47 a 
Number of observations 812 676  415 415  
This table reports the mean difference between firm-year observations with high proportion of female insider directors and firm-year observations with high proportion of female 
insider directors before and after matching for audit fees and control variables between 2002 and 2017. Propensity score matching yields a matched sample consisting of 830 
cases: 415 treatment cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female insider directors) and 415 comparison cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of 
female insider directors). AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BIG is an 
ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; 
AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio 
of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit 
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committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; 
FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to 
total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports 
a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts 
receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural 




Mean difference test between firm-year observations with high proportion of female independent directors and firm-year observations with low 
proportion of female independent directors for entire and matched samples 
Variable 
 
Entire Sample   Matched Sample 




 t-value Treatment Control t-value 
AUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 8113.2 7186.7 1.93* 6840.5 7676.2 1.87 *a 
NAUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 711.1 559.45 1.75* 590.39 578.95 0.09 a 
BIG 1.47 1.46 0.31 1.45 1.45 0.12 
AUD_TEN (Number of years) 13.94 10.91 8.34*** 12.28 12.19 0.20 a 
BD_SIZE (Number of directors) 12.64 12.02 3.24*** 12.28 12.28 0.00 a 
BD_IND 52.98% 44.70% 7.33*** 47.96% 48.37% 0.29 
BD_MEET (Number of meetings) 7.24 6.67 3.45*** 6.68 6.88 0.99 a 
ADC_SIZE 3.87 3.72 2.30** 3.76 3.80 0.44 
ADC_IND 72.92% 64.65% 5.70*** 68.44% 69.07% 0.36 
ADC_MEET (Number of meetings) 4.84 4.45 3.17*** 4.63 4.81 1.43 a 
DUAL 60.62% 52.29% 2.96*** 56.28% 57.65% 0.38 
CEO_TEN (Number of years) 8.46 7.26 2.95*** 8.34 7.73 1.52 a 
FEM_CEO 1.18% 2.46% 1.72* 2.09% 2.46% 0.33 
FAM_OWN 21.97% 28.12% 4.20*** 27.18% 26.75% 0.22 
INST_OWN 33.48% 20.75% 7.79*** 25.23% 25.43% 0.10 
9. LEV 24.18% 24.06% 0.15 23.96% 24.03% 0.06 
TOBIN 1.16 1.20 0.62 1.15 1.16 0.11 
LOSS 12.09% 14.08% 1.04 12.30% 12.57% 0.11 
R&D 2.75% 2.52% 0.77 2.44% 2.59% 0.42 
FOR_ASSETS 16.58% 27.05% 6.08*** 22.44% 20.23% 0.96 
REC&INV 12.08% 15.79% 3.96*** 13.11% 12.97% 0.12 
CROSS 24.63% 29.05% 1.76* 26.70% 25.14% 0.49 
F_SIZE (in billions of euros) 18.99 20.53 2.31** 19.04 20.32 0.69a 
Number of observations 733 755  387 387  
This table reports the mean difference between firm-year observations with high proportion of female nonexecutive independent directors and firm-year observations with low 
proportion of female nonexecutive independent directors before and after matching for audit fees and control variables between 2002 and 2017. Propensity score matching 
yields a matched sample consisting of 774 cases: 387 treatment cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female independent directors) and 387 comparison cases 
(firm-year observations with high proportion of female independent directors). AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE is the natural log 
of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor 
and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log 
of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board 
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meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years 
served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional 
investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the 





Mean difference test between firm-year observations with high proportion of female audit committee members and firm-year observations with 
low proportion of female audit committee members for entire and matched samples 
Variable 
 
Entire Sample   Matched Sample 
  FEM_ADC > 0 FEM_ADC = 0  t-value Treatment Control t-value 
AUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 8136.2 7260.9 1.83* 6306.9 8784.8 3.79***a 
NAUD_FEE (Thousand of euros) 697.92 587.97 1.14 745.27 634.17 0.69a 
BIG 1.45 1.47 0.44 1.44 1.41 0.80 
AUD_TEN (Number of years) 13.92 11.24 7.63*** 12.50 12.49 0.00a 
BD_SIZE (Number of directors) 12.85 11.88 5.01*** 12.12 12.36 0.99a 
BD_IND 50.96% 47.51% 3.51*** 49.66% 49.46% 0.13 
BD_MEET (Number of meetings) 7.25 6.72 3.64*** 6.97 7.31 1.56a 
ADC_SIZE 4.12 3.49 10.75*** 3.70 3.72 0.28 
ADC_IND 70.08% 68.25% 1.87* 68.64% 69.48% 0.44 
ADC_MEET (Number of meetings) 4.88 4.45 4.24*** 4.51 4.75 1.46a 
DUAL 58.66% 55.05% 1.42 57.26% 58.08% 0.22 
CEO_TEN (Number of years) 8.45 7.40 2.81*** 7.83 7.94 0.21a 
FEM_CEO 2.12% 1.42% 1.09 1.64% 1.92% 0.28 
FAM_OWN 23.35% 26.15% 1.79* 24.51% 23.47% 0.56 
INST_OWN 32.90% 22.64% 6.61*** 25.93% 26.09% 0.08 
LEV 25.04% 23.26% 2.31** 24.04% 25.11% 1.02 
TOBIN 1.17 1.18 0.24 1.24 1.17 0.95 
LOSS 12.75% 13.25% 0.54 12.88% 13.42% 0.22 
R&D 2.40% 2.88% 1.57 2.27% 2.54% 0.72 
FOR_ASSETS 15.90% 26.62% 6.88*** 21.36% 21.91% 0.24 
REC&INV 9.97% 17.44% 8.89*** 14.26% 13.86% 0.32 
CROSS 28.59% 24.76% 1.46 25.48% 28.49% 0.92 
F_SIZE (in billions of euros) 24.10 15.44 4.56*** 18.78 20.91 1.31a 
Number of observations 658 659  365 365  
This table reports the mean difference between firm-year observations with female on audit committee and firm-year observations without female on audit committee before 
and after matching for audit fees and control variables between 2002 and 2017. Propensity score matching yields a matched sample consisting of 730 cases: 365 treatment cases 
(firm-year observations with high proportion of female audit committee members) and 365 comparison cases (firm-year observations with high proportion of female audit 
committee members). AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BIG is an ordinal 
variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; 
AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio 
of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit 
committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a 
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dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; 
FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to 
total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports 
a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts 
receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural 




The system GMM regression of audit fees on female directorships and quota law 








Model 4:  
PRFEM_ADC 
Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE + 0.866*** 77.08 0.839*** 101.86 0.886*** 101.79 0.832*** 55.14 
PRFEM_BD ? –0.757*** –10.02       
PRFEM_INS ?   0.151** 2.13     
PRFEM_IND ?     –0.982*** –11.00   
PRFEM_ADC ?       –0.799*** –15.23 
QUOTA ? –0.041*** –2.97 –0.112*** –8.53 0.031** 2.31 –0.047*** –3.26 
BIG + 0.014 1.15 –0.004 –0.35 0.026*** 2.92 0.057*** 4.18 
AUDIT_TEN ? 0.002 0.15 –0.019** –2.36 –0.017* –1.85 0.018 1.54 
NAUD_FEE + 0.010*** 4.79 0.006*** 3.27 0.002 0.69 0.009*** 4.40 
BD_SIZE  + 0.046** 2.25 0.124*** 5.63 0.001 0.03 0.029 0.88 
BD_IND + 0.060** 2.05 0.128*** 5.07 –0.029 –1.00 0.087** 2.50 
BD_MEET + 0.010 0.90 0.025*** 3.43 0.002 0.20 0.006 0.43 
ADC_SIZE + –0.020*** –5.27 –0.012*** –2.91 –0.001 –0.03 –0.015* –1.76 
ADC_IND + –0.081*** –3.18 –0.080*** –5.59 –0.034* –1.90 –0.062* –1.86 
ADC_MEET + 0.006 0.43 0.038*** 4.02 0.031** 2.13 0.033** 2.30 
DUAL + –0.001 –0.16 0.016** 2.38 –0.002 –0.20 –0.006 –0.56 
CEO_TEN + –0.010* –1.88 0.009 1.34 0.010* 1.94 –0.001 –0.05 
FEM_CEO + 0.066*** 2.97 –0.151*** –6.19 –0.166*** –8.72 0.033 1.27 
FAM_OWN + –0.087*** –3.98 –0.017 –0.70 –0.110*** –4.46 –0.129*** –4.63 
INST_OWN + –0.055*** –3.56 –0.015 –1.01 –0.044*** –3.10 –0.079*** –3.66 
LEV + 0.126*** 3.25 0.099*** 3.08 –0.029 –0.95 –0.056 –1.08 
TOBIN – 0.006 1.63 0.012*** 3.67 0.009*** 2.77 0.021*** 2.57 
LOSS + –0.028** –2.19 –0.025** –2.18 –0.045*** –4.23 –0.071*** –4.48 
R&D + –0.073 –0.72 0.063 0.83 –0.035 –0.29 0.246 1.41 
FOR_ASSETS + 0.031* 1.85 –0.013 –1.21 0.061*** 3.87 0.044** 2.08 
RECINV + 0.108*** 3.85 0.002 0.07 –0.039 –1.58 0.002 0.05 
CROSS + 0.055*** 4.12 0.036*** 3.53 0.025* 1.76 0.079*** 4.62 
F_SIZE + 0.063*** 8.17 0.086*** 17.34 0.051*** 7.20 0.080*** 7.27 
Intercept ? 0.154* 1.72 –0.360*** –5.66 0.269*** 3.80 0.133 1.14 
Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes Yes 





F (Prob > F)  10380.30 (p = 0.000) 9555.29 (p = 0.000) 18529.73 (p = 0.000) 14613.69 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value):  –5.25 (p = 0.000) –3.28 (p = 0.001) –4.86 (p = 0.000) –4.21 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value):  –1.43 (p = 0.154) 0.64 (p = 0.519) –1.12 (p = 0.185) –1.15 (p = 0.250) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value):  673.60 (p = 0.000) 684.17 (p = 0.000) 587.63 (p = 0.000) 551.59 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value):  62.86 (p = 0.191) 68.55 (p = 0.185) 66.72 (p = 0.202) 62.71 (p = 0.208) 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of audit fees on quota law and the proportion of female directors (Model 1), the proportion of female insider directors 
(Model 2), the proportion of female independent directors (Model 3) and the proportion of female audit committee members (Model 4). AUD_FEE is the dependent variables 
and measured by the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag AUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; PRFEM_BD is the percentage 
of female directors to total directors; PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board members; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of 
female non-executive independent directors to total number of board directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of audit 
committee directors; QUOTA is a binary variable equal to 1 after the implementation of the quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the 
company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log 
of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total 
number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; 
ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a 
female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at 
the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; 
LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; 
REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 
0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural log of firm’s total assets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 11 
The system GMM regression of audit fees on the interaction between female directorships and quota law 








Model 4:  
PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA 
Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE + 0.867*** 77.68 0.852*** 74.16 0.879*** 81.12 0.824*** 50.15 
PRFEM_BD ? –0.343*** –3.73       
PRFEM_BD*QUOTA  ? –0.697*** –5.80       
PRFEM_INS ?   1.179*** 9.67     
PRFEM_INS*QUOTA ?   –0.241 –1.52     
PRFEM_IND ?     –0.374*** –5.26   
PRFEM_IND*QUOTA ?     –1.021*** –9.31   
PRFEM_ADC ?       –0.977*** –15.17 
PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA ?       –0.300*** –3.89 
QUOTA ? 0.153*** 5.58 0.015 0.83 0.137*** 6.29 0.111*** 4.36 
BIG  + 0.021* 1.93 0.008 0.63 0.032*** 3.93 0.047*** 3.06 
AUDIT_TEN ? 0.009 0.85 –0.053*** –5.15 –0.014 –1.34 0.019 1.45 
NAUD_FEE + 0.011*** 5.15 0.004 1.29 0.001 0.44 0.008*** 3.69 
BD_SIZE  + 0.051* 1.97 0.150*** 4.49 0.039 1.47 0.049 1.47 
BD_IND + 0.061** 2.08 0.078** 2.06 –0.014 –0.45 0.121*** 3.03 
BD_MEET + 0.009 0.83 –0.024 –1.36 0.007 0.60 0.013 0.83 
ADC_SIZE + –0.019*** –4.45 –0.013** –2.51 –0.002 –0.29 –0.016* –1.84 
ADC_IND + –0.077*** –2.93 –0.052** –2.50 –0.031 –1.49 –0.066* –1.90 
ADC_MEET + 0.001 0.02 0.039*** 3.75 0.026* 1.79 0.031** 2.12 
DUAL + 0.007 0.85 0.022** 2.04 –0.005 –0.47 –0.005 –0.45 
CEO_TEN + –0.008 –1.50 0.006 0.72 0.012** 2.21 –0.001 –0.08 
FEM_CEO + 0.068*** 2.72 –0.158*** –4.69 –0.224*** –8.94 0.039 1.51 
FAM_OWN + –0.096*** –3.85 –0.029 –0.83 –0.131*** –5.01 –0.105*** –3.44 
INST_OWN + –0.052*** –2.99 –0.028 –1.17 –0.042*** –3.09 –0.084*** –3.41 
LEV + 0.125*** 3.14 0.155*** 3.47 –0.019 –0.56 –0.043 –0.80 
TOBIN – 0.009*** 3.07 0.012* 1.90 0.014*** 3.79 0.020** 2.25 
LOSS + –0.031** –2.39 –0.021 –1.42 –0.042*** –3.81 –0.068*** –4.32 
R&D + –0.028 –0.24 –0.196 –1.59 –0.122 –1.01 0.163 0.92 
FOR_ASSETS + 0.038** 2.45 –0.005 –0.30 0.057*** 3.24 0.041* 1.90 
RECINV + 0.095*** 2.93 0.072* 1.83 –0.053** –2.12 –0.009 –0.20 
CROSS + 0.058*** 4.40 0.041** 2.50 0.027 1.60 0.085*** 4.36 
F_SIZE + 0.060*** 7.48 0.088*** 12.06 0.049*** 5.79 0.085*** 7.47 




Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs.  856      817 744 685 
F (Prob > F)  7968.22 (p = 0.000) 7989.34 (p = 0.000) 9584.20 (p = 0.000) 3578.04 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –5.26 (p = 0.000) –3.25 (p = 0.000) –4.87 (p = 0.000) –4.20 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –1.42 (p = 0.155) 0.66 (p = 0.510) –1.12 (p = 0.185) –1.07 (p = 0.283) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 667.86 (p = 0.000) 119.31 (p = 0.000) 581.38 (p = 0.000) 546.17 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 71.88 (p = 0.189) 63.41 (p = 0.231) 71.41 (p = 0.195) 72.39 (p = 0.197) 
Joint test: PRFEM_BD + PRFEM_BD*QUOTA –1.041*** –10.13       
Joint test: PRFEM_INS + PRFEM_INS*QUOTA  0.938*** 6.04     
Joint test: PRFEM_IND + PRFEM_IND*QUOTA    –1.396*** –10.84   
Joint test: PRFEM_ADC + PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA      –1.277*** –9.88 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of audit fees on the interaction between female directorships and quota law (Model 1), the interaction between the 
proportion of female insider directors and quota law (Model 2), the interaction between the proportion of female independent directors and quota law (Model 3) and the 
interaction between the proportion of female audit committee members and quota law (Model 4). AUD_FEE is the dependent variables and measured by the natural log of audit 
fees in thousands of euros; Lag AUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to total directors; 
PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board members; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of female non-executive independent directors 
to total number of board directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of audit committee directors; QUOTA is a binary variable 
equal to 1 after the implementation of the quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the 
company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–
client relationship; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of 
non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee 
members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the 
percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is 
the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; 
R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to 
total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE is the natural log of firm’s total assets. 







The system GMM regression of audit fees on the interaction between female directorships (audit committee memberships) and firm size 
Variables  Model 1: 
PRFEM_BD*SIZE_DUM 




Model 4:  
PRFEM_ADC*SIZE_DUM 
Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE  0.635*** 24.03 0.471*** 11.74 0.661*** 21.70 0.656*** 31.66 
PRFEM_BD  0.256* 1.76       
SIZE_DUM   1.357*** 12.69 1.778*** 11.13 1.048*** 9.25 0.968*** 12.06 
PRFEM_BD*SIZE_DUM   –1.749*** –4.89       
PRFEM_INS    1.484*** 3.02     
PRFEM_INS*SIZE_DUM    –2.370*** –3.51     
PRFEM_IND      –0.039 –0.23   
PRFEM_IND*SIZE_DUM       –2.226*** –4.45   
PRFEM_ADC        –0.731*** –3.94 
PRFEM_ADC*SIZE_DUM         –0.039 –0.14 
QUOTA  0.068*** 5.11 –0.045** –2.41 0.082*** 4.43 –0.069*** –3.29 
BIG   –0.014 –0.39 0.021 0.38 –0.001 –0.02 –0.020 –0.76 
AUDIT_TEN  –0.003 –0.11 –0.069 –1.52 –0.025 –0.94 –0.021 –0.61 
NAUD_FEE  0.009 1.59 –0.006 –0.82 0.007 1.43 0.001 0.39 
BD_SIZE   –0.104 –1.33 –0.054 –0.49 –0.037 –0.67 –0.062 –1.17 
BD_IND  –0.020 –0.26 –0.031 –0.33 –0.033 –0.41 –0.033 –0.42 
BD_MEET  0.037 1.39 0.017 0.57 0.048* 1.75 0.059** 2.03 
ADC_SIZE  –0.028** –2.38 –0.034** –2.33 –0.026*** –3.02 –0.048*** –4.46 
ADC_IND  –0.001 –0.00 –0.007 –0.12 –0.061 –1.60 0.027 0.55 
ADC_MEET  0.063 1.53 0.111*** 2.55 0.027 0.72 0.063** 2.41 
DUAL  –0.457*** –7.61 –1.207*** –3.44 –0.406*** –7.99 –0.416*** –7.20 
CEO_TEN  0.023 0.73 –0.016 –0.49 0.048* 1.82 0.017 0.75 
FEM_CEO  –0.043** –2.50 –0.063*** –4.63 –0.054*** –4.11 –0.024 –1.26 
FAM_OWN  0.039 0.56 0.328** 2.43 –0.074 –1.06 0.117 1.27 
INST_OWN  –0.124 –1.76 –0.079 –0.93 –0.048 –1.16 –0.028 –0.51 
LEV  0.017 0.14 –0.061 –0.40 –0.010 –0.13 –0.086 –0.84 
TOBIN  0.083*** 7.18 0.084*** 3.86 0.073*** 6.45 0.090*** 5.64 
LOSS  –0.001 –0.03 0.186*** 3.07 –0.014 –0.48 0.055 1.60 
R&D  –0.487*** –2.59 –1.321*** –2.65 –0.513*** –2.97 0.261 0.92 
FOR_ASSETS  –0.029 –0.82 0.025 0.51 –0.013 –0.38 0.024 0.64 
RECINV  –0.238* –1.82 –0.332** –2.50 –0.116 –1.30 –0.175 –1.54 
CROSS  0.064 1.29 0.036 0.58 0.070** 1.99 0.081** 2.01 




Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs.  856      817 744 685 
F (Prob > F)  4554.58 (p = 0.000) 1336.62 (p = 0.000) 2964.41 (p = 0.000) 8808.43 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –4.63 (p = 0.000) –3.52 (p = 0.000) –4.55 (p = 0.000) –4.20 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –0.91 (p = 0.157) –0.63 (p = 0.530) –1.09 (p = 0.202) –1.34 (p = 0.180) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 550.35 (p = 0.000) 483.32 (p = 0.000) 582.91 (p = 0.000) 508.69 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 66.05 (p = 0.168) 62.64 (p = 0.283) 62.84 (p = 0.247) 66.82 (p = 0.175) 
Joint test: PRFEM_BD + PRFEM_BD*SIZE_DUM –1.492*** –6.14       
Joint test: PRFEM_INS + PRFEM_INS*SIZE_DUM  –0.886*** –2.56     
Joint test: PRFEM_IND + PRFEM_IND*SIZE_DUM    –2.265*** –5.84   
Joint test: PRFEM_ADC + PRFEM_ADC*SIZE_DUM      –0.771*** –6.29 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of audit fees on the interaction between female directorships and firm size (Model 1), the interaction between the 
proportion of female insider directors and firm size (Model 2), the interaction between the proportion of female independent directors and firm size (Model 3) and the interaction 
between the proportion of female audit committee members and firm size (Model 4). AUD_FEE is the dependent variables and measured by the natural log of audit fees in 
thousands of euros; Lag AUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to total directors; PRFEM_INS 
is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board members; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of female non-executive independent directors to total 
number of board directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of audit committee directors; QUOTA is a binary variable equal 
to 1 after the implementation of the quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company 
is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client 
relationship; NAUD_FEE is the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-
executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee 
members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the 
percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is 
the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; 
R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to 
total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 






The system GMM regression of non-audit fees on female directorships and quota law 
Variables  Model 1: 
PRFEM_BD 




Model 4:  
PRFEM_ADC 
Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test Coef. t-test 
Lag NAUD_FEE  0.785*** 62.07 0.777*** 63.37 0.793*** 53.50 0.792*** 42.06 
PRFEM_BD  –1.426*** –3.89       
PRFEM_INS    –0.983*** –3.22     
PRFEM_IND      –1.381*** –3.58   
PRFEM_ADC        –1.629*** –10.94 
QUOTA  0.313*** 3.54 –0.070 –1.19 –0.058 –0.69 0.857*** 13.76 
BIG  0.178*** 2.99 –0.033 –0.77 0.162*** 2.61 0.057 1.09 
AUD_FEE  0.390*** 8.98 0.351*** 5.25 0.143*** 2.62 0.271*** 4.70 
AUDIT_TEN  0.145*** 3.50 0.263*** 6.13 0.089** 2.08 –0.023 –0.43 
BD_SIZE   –0.237** –2.09 –0.126 –0.92 –0.081 –0.55 –0.205* –1.97 
BD_IND  0.017 0.12 0.201 1.46 0.359** 2.20 –0.326* –1.94 
BD_MEET  0.159*** 2.79 0.020 0.58 0.172*** 3.53 0.100* 1.67 
ADC_SIZE  0.015 0.79 0.033 1.55 0.050** 2.09 –0.011 –0.42 
ADC_IND  –0.196* –1.95 –0.470*** –6.73 –0.257** –2.45 –0.012 –0.10 
ADC_MEET  –0.286*** –3.49 0.066 0.97 –0.317*** –5.36 –0.282*** –4.88 
DUAL  0.049 1.06 0.131*** 3.63 –0.006 –0.10 –0.120*** –2.74 
CEO_TEN  –0.068*** –3.11 –0.028 –1.26 –0.016 –0.64 –0.075** –2.35 
FEM_CEO  1.202 0.85 0.126 1.40 0.073 0.37 –0.157 –0.73 
FAM_OWN  0.222* 1.91 0.175** 2.30 0.196* 1.65 0.264** 2.05 
INST_OWN  0.323*** 2.62 0.591*** 7.24 0.486*** 5.39 0.230** 2.43 
LEV  –0.196 –0.86 –0.292* –1.83 –0.007 –0.04 0.148 0.71 
TOBIN  –0.021 –0.97 –0.001 –0.06 0.007 0.32 0.033* 1.79 
LOSS  –0.039 –0.45 –0.018 –0.33 –0.110 –1.23 0.130** 2.35 
R&D  –1.401** –2.55 0.361 0.88 –0.885 –1.32 –1.166*** –3.19 
FOR_ASSETS  0.435*** 7.11 0.391*** 7.09 0.353*** 3.62 0.105 1.30 
RECINV  0.121 0.62 –0.075 –0.60 –0.403*** –2.59 –0.337*** –3.65 
CROSS  –0.198** –2.36 –0.089* –1.69 –0.240*** –3.40 0.008 0.17 
F_SIZE  –0.016 –0.57 –0.069** –2.25 0.027 0.68 0.071** 2.05 
Intercept  –1.481*** –3.66 –1.293*** –3.81 –0.738 –1.59 –1.445*** –3.69 
Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes Yes 





F (Prob > F) 18191.64 (p = 0.000) 7608.01 (p = 0.000) 3328.07 (p = 0.000) 10826.46 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –4.52 (p = 0.000) –4.35 (p = 0.000) –5.01 (p = 0.000) –4.86 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –0.90 (p = 0.367) –0.08 (p = 0.940) –1.36 (p = 0.173) –0.46 (p = 0.648) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 684.27 (p = 0.000) 663.77 (p = 0.000) 114.10 (p = 0.000) 608.20 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 64.48 (p = 0.260) 67.71 (p = 0.204) 64.28 (p = 0.209) 70.10 (p = 0.132) 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of non-audit fees on quota law and the proportion of female directors (Model 1), the proportion of female insider 
directors (Model 2), the proportion of female independent directors (Model 3) and the proportion of female audit committee members (Model 4). NAUD_FEE is the dependent 
variables and measured by the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag NAUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of non-audit fees; PRFEM_BD 
is the percentage of female directors to total directors; PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board members; PRFEM_IND is the 
percentage of female non-executive independent directors to total number of board directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total 
number of audit committee directors; QUOTA is a binary variable equal to 1 after the implementation of the quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable 
coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is 
the natural log of the average number of years of the auditors–client relationship; AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of 
the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board 
meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years 
served at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional 
investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the 





The system GMM regression of non-audit fees on the interaction between female directorships and quota law 
Variables  Model 1: 
PRFEM_BD*QUOTA 




Model 4:  
PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA 
Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t–test Coef. t-test 
Lag NAUD_FEE  0.808*** 52.32 0.784*** 44.60 0.796*** 55.29 0.788*** 39.46 
PRFEM_BD  –1.099** –2.01       
PRFEM_BD*QUOTA   0.976 1.31       
PRFEM_INS    –4.028*** –6.82     
PRFEM_INS*QUOTA    5.471*** 5.43     
PRFEM_IND      0.388 0.75   
PRFEM_IND*QUOTA      –2.758*** –2.79   
PRFEM_ADC        –4.286*** –17.56 
PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA        4.284*** 12.28 
QUOTA  –0.143 –1.11 –0.546*** –3.93 0.156 1.15 –0.109 –1.04 
BIG   0.005 0.08 –0.099** –2.14 0.182*** 3.01 0.045 0.76 
AUDIT_TEN  0.247*** 4.05 0.361*** 5.10 0.127** 2.22 0.204*** 3.15 
AUD_FEE  0.058 0.97 0.280*** 7.18 0.105** 2.20 –0.064 –1.23 
BD_SIZE   –0.049 –0.46 –0.162 –1.22 –0.002 –0.02 –0.011 –0.11 
BD_IND  0.360** 2.22 0.328*** 2.55 0.420*** 2.57 –0.016 –0.11 
BD_MEET  0.164*** 2.92 0.055 1.61 0.169*** 3.38 0.204*** 2.79 
ADC_SIZE  0.039 1.23 0.047** 2.06 0.044* 1.88 –0.040* –1.75 
ADC_IND  –0.159 –1.43 –0.384*** –5.19 –0.243** –2.25 –0.061 –0.49 
ADC_MEET  –0.244*** –3.23 0.012 0.17 –0.314*** –5.21 –0.316*** –5.24 
DUAL  –0.070 –1.28 0.130*** 2.70 –0.012 –0.21 –0.065 –1.54 
CEO_TEN  –0.005 –0.20 –0.015 –0.63 –0.010 –0.38 –0.075** –2.46 
FEM_CEO  0.435* 1.93 –0.357*** –2.61 –0.082 –0.37 –0.043 –0.22 
FAM_OWN  0.219* 1.66 0.230* 1.95 0.167 1.19 0.517*** 3.59 
INST_OWN  0.278** 2.50 0.545*** 5.40 0.489*** 5.59 0.396*** 4.96 
LEV  –0.345* –1.83 –0.612*** –3.68 –0.055 –0.28 0.339 1.62 
TOBIN  0.054*** 2.66 –0.014 –0.84 0.019 0.97 0.046** 2.07 
LOSS  –0.067 –0.73 0.031 0.46 –0.117 –1.28 0.142** 2.30 
R&D  –0.679 –1.19 –0.228 –0.47 –0.997 –1.43 –1.313*** –3.24 
FOR_ASSETS  0.205*** 2.80 0.333*** 6.48 0.343*** 3.57 0.113 1.12 
RECINV  –0.263 –1.22 –0.237* –1.73 –0.514*** –3.38 –0.166 –1.22 
CROSS  –0.193*** –2.58 –0.156*** –2.86 –0.244*** –3.54 –0.113* –1.93 
F_SIZE  0.002 0.06 –0.071** –2.37 0.019 0.50 0.090** 2.37 





Industry (?)  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs.  856      817 744 685 
F (Prob > F)  982.60 (p = 0.000) 6111.39 (p = 0.000) 3483.34 (p = 0.000) 7869.92 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –5.35 (p = 0.000) –4.43 (p = 0.000) –5.01 (p = 0.000) –4.91 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –1.06 (p = 0.139) –0.06 (p = 0.954) –1.34 (p = 0.181) –0.50 (p = 0.617) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 152.05 (p = 0.000) 660.68 (p = 0.000) 113.32 (p = 0.000) 612.46 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 56.65 (p = 0.413) 66.42 (p = 0.209) 63.80 (p = 0.195) 68.46 (p = 0.142) 
Joint test: PRFEM_BD + PRFEM_BD*QUOTA –0.123 –0.27       
Joint test: PRFEM_INS + PRFEM_INS*QUOTA  1.443** 2.08     
Joint test: PRFEM_IND + PRFEM_IND*QUOTA    –2.370*** –3.42   
Joint test: PRFEM_ADC + PRFEM_ADC*QUOTA      –0.002 –0.01 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of non-audit fees on the interaction between female directorships and quota law (Model 1), the interaction between 
the proportion of female insider directors and quota law (Model 2), the interaction between the proportion of female independent directors and quota law (Model 3) and the 
interaction between the proportion of female audit committee members and quota law (Model 4). NAUD_FEE is the dependent variables and measured by the natural log of 
non-audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag NAUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of non-audit fees; PRFEM_BD is the percentage of female directors to 
total directors; PRFEM_INS is the percentage of female insider board directors to total number of board members; PRFEM_IND is the percentage of female non-executive 
independent directors to total number of board directors; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total number of audit committee directors; 
QUOTA is a binary variable equal to 1 after the implementation of the quota law reform in 2012 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the company is audited 
by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average 
number of years of the auditors–client relationship; AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; 
BD_IND is the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total 
number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; 
DUAL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served at the company before 
becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of 
financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio 
of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 0 otherwise; F_SIZE 








Incremental effect of having female directors on the audit committee to having female directors 
on the board only 
Variables  Model 1: 
AUD_FEE 
Model 2:  
NAUD_FEE 
Coef. t-test Coef. t-test 
Lag AUD_FEE  0.893*** 93.35   
Lag NAUD_FEE    0.794*** 41.87 
PRFEM_ADC  –0.112*** –3.12 –1.489*** –7.31 
PRFEM_BDONLY  –0.063*** –6.27 0.455*** 6.73 
QUOTA  –0.003 –0.15 0.441*** 4.58 
BIG  –0.016* –1.82 0.256*** 3.65 
NAUD_FEE  0.011 1.06   
AUD_FEE    0.185*** 2.78 
AUDIT_TEN  0.007*** 3.66 –0.169** –2.18 
BD_SIZE   0.153*** 7.20 –0.736*** –4.59 
BD_IND  0.100*** 2.74 –0.606** –2.12 
BD_MEET  0.048*** 3.19 –0.091 –0.95 
ADC_SIZE  –0.017*** –2.54 0.109** 2.16 
ADC_IND  0.005 0.24 –0.176 –0.96 
ADC_MEET  0.036*** 3.00 –0.159** –2.00 
DUAL  0.016* 1.89 –0.201 –0.78 
CEO_TEN  0.023*** 3.99 –0.092 –1.35 
FEM_CEO  0.014 0.69 –0.093* –1.77 
FAM_OWN  0.007 0.31 0.059 0.36 
INST_OWN  –0.011 –0.53 0.250* 1.78 
LEV  –0.080** –2.01 0.562** 2.18 
TOBIN  0.013*** 2.46 0.016 0.71 
LOSS  –0.057*** –4.17 0.120 1.45 
R&D  –0.101 –0.77 –0.930 –1.57 
FOR_ASSETS  0.015 1.11 0.362** 2.34 
RECINV  0.006 0.20 –0.465** –2.05 
CROSS  –0.016 –1.10 0.251** 2.40 
F_SIZE  0.068*** 9.32 0.052 1.03 
Intercept  –0.639*** –7.51 0.409 0.71 
Industry (?)  Yes Yes 
Number of obs.  685      685 
F (Prob > F) 5697.66 (p = 0.000) 2889.94 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –4.27 (p = 0.000) –4.90 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –1.19 (p = 0.153) –0.45 (p = 0.656) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 538.92 (p = 0.000) 577.87 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 62.69 (p = 0.179) 68.41 (p = 0.143) 
The table presents results of the system GMM regressions of audit fees (Model 1) and non-audit fees (Model 2) on 
the proportion of having female audit committee members and the proportion of female directors who are only on the 
board and do not participate on the audit committee. AUD_FEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of euros; 
NAUD_FEE is the dependent variables and measured by the natural log of non-audit fees in thousands of euros; Lag 
AUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value of the natural log of audit fees; Lag NAUD_FEE is the one-year lagged value 
of the natural log of non-audit fees; PRFEM_ADC is the percentage of female audit committee members to total 
number of audit committee directors; PRFEM_BDONLY is the proportion of female directors who are only on the 
board and do not participate in the audit committee compared to total numbers of board directors; QUOTA is a binary 
variable equal to 1 after the adoption of the quota law reform in 2011 and 0 otherwise; BIG is an ordinal variable 
coded 0 if the company is audited by non-Big auditors, 1 if the company is audited by only one Big auditor and 2 if 
the company is audited by two Big auditors; AUD_TEN is the natural log of the average number of years of the 
auditors–client relationship; BD_SIZE is the natural log of the total number of directors; BD_IND is the ratio of non-
executive independent directors to total number of directors; BD_MEET is the natural log of the number of board 
meeting; ADC_SIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ADC_MEET is the number of audit committee 
meeting. FEM_CEO is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise; DUAL is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the CEO serves as board Chair and 0 otherwise; CEO_TEN is the natural log of the number of years served 
58 
at the company before becoming CEO; FAM_OWN is the percentage of capital held by family investors; INST_OWN 
is the percentage of capital held by institutional investors; LEV is the ratio of financial debt to total assets; TOBIN is 
the stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets; LOSS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; 
FOR_ASSETS is the ratio of foreign assets to total assets; REC&INV is the ratio of accounts receivable and inventory 
to total assets; CROSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is simultaneously listed in France and the USA and 






Countries with mandatory board gender diversity reforms 
Country Quota PLCs SOEs Year Introduced Compliance Year 
Austria 30%: PLCs 
35%: SOEs 
Yes Yes 2017 2018 
Belgium 33% Yes Yes 2011 2012: SOEs 
2017: PTFs 
Finland 40%: SOEs  
At least one: PLCs 
Yes Yes 2005: SOEs 
2008: PTFs 
2005: SOEs 
France 40% Yes No 2011 2017 
Germany 30% & 50% Yes Yes 2014 2016 & 2018 
Iceland 40% Yes Yes 2010 2013 
India At least one Yes  2013 2015 
Israel 50%: SOEs  
At least one: PLCs 




Italy 33% Yes Yes 2011: PLCs 
2012: SOEs 
2015 
Kenya 33% No Yes 2010 2010 
Netherlands 30% yes No 2013 2016 
Norway 40% Yes Yes 2003 2006: SOEs 
2008: PLCs 
Spain 40% Yes No 2007 2-15 
UAE At least one  Yes No 2012 N/A 
Pakistan At least one  Yes No 2017 2020 











Australia 2011 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
Ireland 2012 The UK Corporate Governance Code and The Irish Corporate Governance 
Annex 
Luxembourg 2009 The Ten Principles of Corporate Governance of the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange 
Malawi 2010 The Malawi Code II: Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance in 
Malawi 
Nigeria 2011 Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 
Poland 2010 Code of Best Practices for Warsaw Stock Exchange Listed Companies 
Sweden 2007 & 2010 The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
United 
Kingdom 
2012 The UK Corporate Governance Code 
United States 2010 Report of the NYSE Commission on Corporate Governance 
 
 
